# aff vs centennial

## fdi kt econ

**Tentori and Zandonini 2013** (Davide Tentori, Visiting Researcher Int’l Economics at Chatham House. Myriam Zandonini, Research Assistant Int’l Economics at Chatham House. “The Transatlantic Relationship And The Future Global Governance; Trends and Leadership Challenges in the Evolution of the Global Economic System”; Working Paper 09; March 2013; [www.iai.it/pdf/Transworld/TW\_WP\_09.pdf](http://www.iai.it/pdf/Transworld/TW_WP_09.pdf); JRS)

Increasing steadily since the end of World War II, global trade rose from only 59 US billion dollar in 1948 up to 17.8 US trillion dollar in 2011 current prices (WTO 2012). In the last seven years trade increased with an annual growth rate of 3.5 percent. Nevertheless, trade patterns have been heavily affected by economic instability and

do not seem able to follow a clear trend. Dropping almost five times more than the fall in world GDP, the “sudden, severe and synchronised […] great trade collapse” of 2009 (Baldwin 2009), which was caused by a demand shock following the crisis the year before, was amplified by consumers’ uncertainty and concerned almost all world regions.

Unsurprisingly, China and emerging economies are mainly responsible for the increase in global trade. As a whole, South America recorded the highest increase in exports performance, with an annual 10 percent in the period 2005-2011. Led by a labour intensive manufacturing sector for export markets (a thoroughly conceived and implemented strategy of economic growth by the government), the Chinese economy overtook Germany and became the second largest exporter in 2009, expanding six times since it joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001.

The world economy has undoubtedly become increasingly more open. Tariff barriers have mostly been removed, at least among developed economies, while forms of protectionism, both in terms of tariff and non tariff barriers, still tend to persist among developing countries (Mohan, Khorana and Choudhury 2012). Although an agreement within the WTO might sustain the process of global economic recovery at least by increasing security in international trade relations, efforts towards further multilateral reductions have come to a halt following the failure of the Doha round on global trade liberalization in 2011 and Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) mushroomed.

At present, there are 243 PTAs in force (WTO 2012) and they are generally bilateral agreements or take the form of Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs). While the most famous RTA is the European Community Treaty (ECT), RTAs have proliferated in Latin America and Asia and in both the EU’s and the US’s trade relations with developing countries. The dominance of this approach seems to represent the only way to push forward the global process of trade liberalization at the moment. However, the multiplicity of bilateral trade agreements is inefficient and detrimental to the global economic system, since overlapping PTAs and the lack of clear and unanimously agreed rules cause uncertainty (Tussie and Quiliconi 2005; Baldwin 2006). Provided that new efforts are made to restart the multilateral approach to trade liberalization, it would take years to achieve a widespread agreement. Bilateralism – or, at best, regionalism – is likely to be the key approach for further trade negotiations.

**Li and Liu 2005** ([Xiaoying Li](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0305750X04002013), Univ of Nottingham, UK; [Xiaming Liu](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0305750X04002013), Univ of Surrey, UK; “Foreign Direct Investment and Economic Growth: An Increasingly Endogenous Relationship”; [World Development](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/0305750X); Vol 33, Issue 3, March 2005, 393–407; [www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0305750X04002013](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0305750X04002013); JRS)

5. Conclusions This study investigates the impact of FDI on economic growth in both developed and developing countries using a large crosscountry sample for the period 1970–99. The test results suggest that endogeneity between FDI and economic growth does not exist for the whole sample period. Only from the mid-1980s, do FDI and economic growth become significantly complementary to each other and form an increasingly endogenous relationship. Thus, the single equations are used for the full sample, and simultaneous-equation systems are applied for the subsamples covering the period 1985–99.

This study shows that there is a strong complementary connection between FDI and economic growth in both developed and developing countries. Furthermore, FDI not only directly promotes economic growth by itself but also indirectly does so via its interaction terms. There is a strong positive interaction effect of FDI with human capital and a strong negative interaction effect of FDI with the technology gap on economic growth in developing countries.

The empirical results from this study lend strong support to new FDI and economic growth theories, as they confirm that inward FDI tends to be attracted to any host country with a large market size. In addition, human capital and technology-absorptive ability are very important for inward FDI to positively promote economic growth in developing countries. The policy implications of this study are relatively straightforward. As FDI and economic growth have become increasingly endogenously related, the promotion of human capital, technological capabilities, and economic development will lead to more FDI inflows. This in turn will promote further economic growth and enhance competitiveness.

## 2ac say yes

**2). sovereignty—BITs empower host states, which address a key component of Maduro’s concern**

**EBRV 13**—Embassy of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (4/26, “Venezuela Wants Respect for its Sovereignty to Improve Relations with US”, <http://venezuela-us.org/2013/04/26/venezuela-wants-respect-for-its-sovereignty-to-improve-relations-with-us/>) EL

An indispensable condition to improve relations between Venezuela and the US government is respect for national sovereignty, the new charge d’affaires of the Venezuelan Embassy in Washington, Calixto Ortega, said Thursday, reiterating the countries will for smoother bilateral dialogue. “We know that it will not be a bed of roses, but we also have the push of goodwill from many sectors in the US and the best possible will manifested by the Venezuelan government begin to open those channels, with respect, especially on the issue of sovereignty,” he said. In an interview with the TV channel Venevisión, Ortega recalled that Venezuela – US relations have historically been marked by commercial exchange. “We have been an important supplier of oil, Venezuela has refineries there, we serve more than 8,000 gas stations in the US and they supply us in various areas such as information technology,” he said. Meanwhile, the new embassy chief reasserted the international policy sustained by the government of President Hugo Chávez regarding the promotion of a multi polar world, saying this means “we open the doors to relations with many other countries as well with total and absolute sovereignty.”

**3). Maduro will be more accommodating to foreign investment—seen as political oxygen**

**Shifter 13**— President at Inter-American Dialogue (“The Empire Makes Nice Is it time for a Venezuela reset?”, 3/11, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/03/11/the\_empire\_makes\_nice\_venezuela\_hugo\_chavez?page=0,2) EL

Though uncertainty abounds in the country that Chávez so thoroughly dominated for so long, the most likely scenario is that acting President Nicolás Maduro, Chávez's designated successor, will win the election scheduled for April 14. He will benefit from an emotional boost from Chavez's death and a demoralized opposition that that was thrown off balance by major defeats in presidential and gubernatorial elections in late 2012. Maduro will preside over a government made up of diverse factions that, absent Chávez's charisma and political shrewdness, will have a hard time staying together -- particularly as the country's already serious economic conditions worsen. The Obama administration should take two critical facts about Venezuela's post-Chávez political reality into account. First, since Maduro is not Chávez, he will have little choice but to govern in a different fashion than his predecessor. Lacking comparable magnetism and resources, Maduro will likely be somewhat more accommodating to those Chávez treated with utter intransigence, such as the private sector, foreign investors, and the opposition. Maduro, acting out of self-interest, will need, and look for, political oxygen. The second is simply the risk of turbulence in Venezuela, especially after the upcoming electoral cycle. To be sure, analysts' occasional predictions about political violence during the Chávez years were (happily) not borne out. And given the extent of rancor and polarization in the society, it is striking how little political violence there has been (common crime, on the other hand, has skyrocketed). Still, the security situation is far from settled -- a militia force of 125,000 answered directly to Chávez -- and it would be a mistake to rule out chaotic and perilous scenarios that should be of great concern to the entire hemisphere. What does this mean for Washington? Assuming that Maduro succeeds Chávez, the Obama administration should be amenable to taking steps toward establishing a better relationship with Caracas. Since the relationship today is practically nonexistent, that would not require a big leap.

## at: warming inev

**Avoiding a 3 degree increase solves – otherwise positive feedbacks lock in runaway warming**

**Mills 11** - \*MSc in Geological Sciences @ Cambridge

Robin, “Capturing Carbon: The New Weapon in the War Against Climate Change,” Google Book

Even if carbon dioxide emissions were to stop today, the built-in inertia in the climate system would lead to temperatures increasing further. In addition to the 0.75CC rise since the nineteenth century, we are already committed to a further warming of 0.6°C. If emissions, and hence temperatures, continue to rise, warming may be as much as 4°C by 2050—and locally much more, 15°C hotter in the Arctic and 10°C in western and southern Africa. At this level, climate impacts will become more and more serious. Extinctions are likely to increase sharply, while extreme heat-waves, forest die-offs, flooding of major river deltas, persistent severe droughts, mass migrations,33 wars and famines are all possible. We may soon pass, or already have passed, the point at which, over the next few centuries, parts of the West Ant¬arctic and Greenland ice sheets melt irreversibly, with potential sea level rises of 1.5 and 2-3 metres respectively.34 Due to feedback mechanisms and poorly understood components of global climate, there is even the possibility of a sudden, rapid catastrophic change. For example, open ocean absorbs more heat from the sun than ice. Melting permafrost''' and warming ocean bottom waters3\* release carbon dioxide and the powerful greenhouse gas methane, driving further warming. Carbon sinks will become increasingly ineffective37 as forests die off, soils dry out and warmer oceans dissolve less carbon dioxide, so that ecosystems may become net contributors of carbon dioxide to the atmosphere, rather than net absorbers as today. The shade of clouds may diminish over warming oceans,38 while melting ice shelves may lead to sudden collapse of grounded ice, and hence rapid rises in sea level.w The picture is complicated further by some offsetting effects, due for instance to increased plant growth in a warmer, more C02-rich world. Changes in cloudiness, snowfall and albedo (reflectiveness) of vegetation may have warming or cooling effects. Such positive feedbacks may greatly accelerate warming. Unpre-dictable, non-linear effects can lead to prolonged droughts in the Mediterranean, California41 or West Africa,42 or to weakening of ocean circulation43 with knock-on effects including a rise in North Atlantic sea levels of up to 1 metre, a collapse of fisheries, disruption of the South Asian monsoon,44 and possibly (albeit unlikely) sharp cooling in Europe.45 Similar rapid changes are documented from Earth history, as at the end of the Ice Ages. At one time, at the end of the so-called Younger Dryas event around 12,000 years ago, Europe warmed by some 5°C within two decades.4" It seems increasingly clear, from geo¬logical studies, that the climate system is unstable and prone to abrupt transitions from one state to another, so further warming might trigger entirely unforeseen consequences.47 We should not give in to alarmism, and such disastrous shifts are thought to be unlikely—but their consequences are serious enough to be worth guarding against. This is about as far as the weight of consensus has reached,4\*1 Yet many individuals and corporations continue to deny the reality of anthropogenic climate change. The US petroleum and coal businesses, in particular certain commentators,49 and many of the general public across the world,''" continue to maintain that the climate is not warming, that elevated carbon dioxide does not cause warming, that rising carbon dioxide and temperatures are not caused by humans, that the consequences of climate change will be benign, or some combination of these positions. Beyond this understanding, there remains great uncertainty and debate on how much warming will occur for given changes in atmospheric carbon dioxide, how serious the impacts of this warming will be, how the climate will change at regional and local levels, how much it is worth spending to reduce climate change,1' exactly what types of action we should take, and how we should go about encouraging global action. Despite extensive and continuing research, these major uncertainties will persist for the foreseeable future. Some of the debate is a normative one, about the values of our civilisation, and therefore is not even capable of being solved by scientific inquiry. Such uncer-tainty and controversy, though, is not a reason for inaction. After all, we ban certain drugs suspected to be carcinogenic, without waiting for absolute proof, and we will only know the truth about some of these climate change disasters when they actually strike. I will take as my starting point here, in this fast-evolving area of research, the view that we should attempt to keep total warming below 2-3°C.52 The original goal of the EU, recommended by the Interna¬tional Climate Change Task Force, was for a maximum temperature rise of 2°C,j3 but given the delay in taking major action, and the latest science, this already seems to be very tough to achieve. Anything above 2°C is already dangerous but, with luck, avoiding rises over 3CC will prevent the most damaging effects of climate change. Otherwise, we will venture into uncharted territory, where the risk of abrupt climatic changes is high: 'Once the world has warmed by 4°C, conditions will be so different from anything we can observe today (and still more dif¬ferent from the last ice age) that it is inherently hard to say where the warming will stop.'55

## 2ac co2

**Co2 doesn’t boost yields – any evidence of growth is short-term and hypothetical**

**Jackson 9** – Research molecular biologist @ USDA

Eric, 2009, “The international food system and the climate crisis,” The Panama News, Lexis

A major weakness in the forecasts of the IPCC and others when it comes to agriculture is that their predictions accept a theory of “carbon fertilization,” which argues that higher levels CO2 in the atmosphere will enhance photosynthesis in many key crops, and boost their yields. Recent studies show that this is a mirage. Not only does any initial acceleration in growth slow down significantly after a few days or weeks, but the increase in CO2 reduces nitrogen and protein in the leaves by more than 12 percent. This means that, with climate change, there will be less protein for humans in major cereals such as wheat and rice. There will also be less nitrogen in the leaves for bugs, which means that bugs will eat more leaf, leading to important reductions in yields

**Positive feedback — rising CO2 levels cause plants to release more greenhouse gasses like methane and nitrous oxide**

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In producing global warming, CO2 is responsible for the largest part of the anthropogenic impact on Earth's energy balance. It is, of course, also an essential nutrient for plant metabolism. Numerous CO2-enrichment experiments over the past two decades have demonstrated the positive effect of elevated CO2 on plant growth — increased biomass and increased carbon storage in soils3. The vegetation response to elevated CO2 might be constrained by various interactions with water and nutrients such as nitrogen4, 5. However, experiments and model projections suggest that accelerated plant growth due to CO2 fertilization could draw down some of this gas from the atmosphere, and hence could weaken future rates of CO2 increase and lessen the severity of climate change6.Van Groenigen et al.2 present evidence that rising levels of CO2 are not only resulting in an increased carbon sink in terrestrial ecosystems, but could also cause increased emissions of other, much more potent, greenhouse gases such as methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O) from soils. Methane is produced by anaerobic methanogenic microorganisms that thrive in wetlands, including rice paddies, where labile (biologically accessible) carbon is available and diffusion of oxygen into the soil is severely restricted. Nitrous oxide is mainly produced in soils by aerobic nitrifying and anaerobic denitrifying bacteria. The interaction between nitrogen availability and soil water content controls the rate of N2O production. The respective global-warming potentials of CH4 and N2O are 25 and 298 times greater than that of CO2, and thus they influence Earth's energy balance even though they occur in much smaller concentrations.Van Groenigen and colleagues collected information from 49 published studies that reported the effect of atmospheric CO2 enrichment on CH4 and N2O fluxes from soils. Using a meta-analysis, they show that elevated CO2 stimulated N2O emissions by 18.8%, and that CH4 emissions from wetlands increased by 13.2% and from rice paddies by as much as 43.4%. Notably, they also suggest the mechanisms that are probably responsible for these observed increases in greenhouse-gas emissions (Fig. 1).Their suggestion goes as follows. Elevated CO2 led to reduced plant transpiration (the evaporation of water from plant surfaces, leaves in particular), which increased soil water content and promoted the existence of anaerobic microsites in soils. This, together with increasing biological activity, probably stimulated denitrification and consequently N2O production. Also, the CO2-induced increase in root biomass may have contributed by increasing the availability of labile carbon, a crucial energy source for denitrification. The CO2-induced stimulation of CH4 emissions from wetlands and rice paddies was probably the result of higher net plant production, leading to increasing carbon availability for substrate-limited methanogenic microorganisms. Extrapolating their results to the global scale, van Groenigen et al.2 estimate that the combined effect of stimulated N2O and CH4 emissions could be equivalent to at least 1.12Pg CO2 yr−1 (Pg = petagrams = 1015 grams). This is around 17% of the expected increase of the terrestrial CO2 sink as a result of higher CO2 concentrations.

**No limit to agricultural productivity, things will improve**

**Simon 96** Julian Simon, Former Professor of Business Administration at the University of Maryland and Former Senior Fellow at the CATO Institute, “The Ultimate Resource 2”, 1996, p. 102-104

Nor is this any "ultimate" limit. Rather, these gains are just the result of research over the past few decades, and there is no reason to think that future research in the next century or the next seven billion years could not greatly multiply productivity. It is likely that before the world gets to 500 billion people, or even to 10 billion, the maximum output per acre will be increased much beyond what PhytoFarm achieves now. The discussion so far does not take account of such existing technology as bovine growth hormone, which has no proven effect on humans yet greatly increases the yield of milk products.' Nor does the above assessment reflect such innovations as genetically engineered plants, which will surely produce huge commercial gains in the next century.10 For example, rapeseed output can already be boosted 15 to 30 percent with genetic engineering." The possibilities already shown to be feasible are astounding. For example, one might insert into a potato genes from a moth that affect the potato's coloring.12 Other genes might make proteins in a potato with the full complement of amino acids that humans need—giving the benefits of meat and potatoes by eating the potatoes alone. Please keep in mind that this technology has been developed after only a few decades of work on the topic, and only a little more than a century after the first scientific knowledge of genetics. Potential progress in the future—even within the next few decades and centuries—is awesome. Doomsaying forecasts about population growth outstripping the food supply that take no account of these possibilities surely are seriously inadequate.

## 2ac so2

**Co2 is key**

**UCS 09** (Union of Concerned Scientists, “Global Warming FAQ,” Union of Concerned Scientists, 7/14/2009, <http://www.ucsusa.org/global_warming/science_and_impacts/science/global-warming-faq.html>, ADP)

Global warming is primarily a problem of too much carbon dioxide in the atmosphere.  This carbon overload is caused mainly when we burn fossil fuels like coal, oil and gas or cut down and burn forests. There are many heat-trapping gases (from methane to water vapor), but CO2 puts us at the greatest risk of irreversible changes if it continues to accumulate unabated in the atmosphere. There are two key reasons why. CO2 has caused most of the warming and its influence is expected to continue. CO2, more than any other climate driver, has contributed the most to climate change between 1750 and 2005.[1, 2, 3] The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) issued a global climate assessment in 2007 that compared the relative influence exerted by key heat-trapping gases, tiny particles known as aerosols, and land use change of human origin on our climate between 1750 and 2005.[3] By measuring the abundance of heat-trapping gases in ice cores, the atmosphere, and other climate drivers along with models, the IPCC calculated the “radiative forcing” (RF) of each climate driver—in other words, the net increase (or decrease) in the amount of energy reaching Earth’s surface attributable to that climate driver. Positive RF values represent average surface warming and negative values represent average surface cooling. CO2 has the highest positive RF (see Figure 1) of all the human-influenced climate drivers compared by the IPCC. Other gases have more potent heat-trapping ability molecule per molecule than CO2 (e.g. methane), but are simply far less abundant in the atmosphere and being added more slowly.

**SO2 cooling is just an unquantifiable fudge factor in models, new evidence actually shows it causes warming by increasing water vapor—answers their CO2 water vapor turn**

**World Climate Report, 4/22/2005**. “[Change of Direction: Do SO2 Emissions Lead to Warming?](http://www.worldclimatereport.com/index.php/2005/04/22/change-of-direction-do-so2-emissions-lead-to-warming/)” Climate Science Blog managed and edited by Patrick J. Michaels, PhD Ecological Climatology @ U Wisconsin and director of the Center for the Study of Science at the Cato Institute, Robert C. Balling, Jr., Director, Office of Climatology and Associate professor of Geography, Arizona State University, and Robert E. Davis, Professor of Climatology @ UVA, http://www.worldclimatereport.com/index.php/2005/04/22/change-of-direction-do-so2-emissions-lead-to-warming/.

Many scientists believe that sulfur dioxide emissions, either from un-scrubbed power plants or from large-scale agricultural burning, serve to cool the planet’s surface temperature. ¶ The cooling mechanism is fairly straightforward. Sulfur dioxide is transformed in the atmosphere into sulfate aerosol, a fine particle that reflects away the sun’s radiation. The particles also serve as the condensation nuclei for cloud droplets which also reflect away the sun’s energy. ¶ On the other hand, no one really knows the magnitude of these cooling effects (if any). So we have argued that sulfate cooling is simply a fudge factor put into climate models in order to chill the overly-hot projections they make if left to their own devices. ¶ Now comes evidence that sulfur dioxide actually can enhance global warming.¶ While this doesn’t mean that sulfates aren’t also cooling things by reflecting away radiation, the parent, sulfur dioxide, can do some other things that make the surface warmer. According to research just published in Geophysical Research Letters by J. Notholt and his co-authors, sulfur dioxide is converted to sulfuric acid (remember “acid rain”?), which leads to more ice crystals in the upper atmosphere. Some of these are eventually lifted upwards into the stable stratosphere where they increase the amount of water vapor found there.¶ Water vapor in the stratosphere serves as a greenhouse gas and is involved in the destruction of ozone, resulting in a stratospheric cooling and a warming of the lower atmosphere and surface.

## 2ac – t-no qpq

**\*Counter-interpretation --- “Economic engagement” can be unconditional or conditional**

**Kahler 4** – Miles Kahler, Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies at the University of California, San Diego, and Scott L. Kastner Department of Government and Politics University of Maryland, “Strategic Uses of Economic Interdependence: Engagement Policies in South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan”, November, http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/kastner/KahlerKastner.doc

Economic engagement—a policy of deliberately expanding economic ties with an adversary in order to change the behavior of the target state and effect an improvement in bilateral political relations—is the subject of growing, but still limited, interest in the international relations literature. The bulk of the work on economic statecraft continues to focus on coercive policies such as economic sanctions. The emphasis on negative forms of economic statecraft is not without justification: the use of economic sanctions is widespread and well-documented, and several quantitative studies have shown that adversarial relations between countries tend to correspond to reduced, rather than enhanced, levels of trade (Gowa 1994; Pollins 1989). At the same time, however, relatively little is known about how widespread strategies of economic engagement actually are: scholars disagree on this point, in part because no database cataloging instances of positive economic statecraft exists (Mastanduno 2003). Furthermore, beginning with the classic work of Hirschman (1945), most studies in this regard have focused on policies adopted by great powers. But engagement policies adopted by South Korea and the other two states examined in this study, Singapore and Taiwan, demonstrate that engagement is not a strategy limited to the domain of great power politics; instead, it may be more widespread than previously recognized. We begin by developing a theoretical framework through which to examine strategies of economic engagement. Drawing from the existing literature, our framework distinguishes between different forms of economic engagement, and outlines the factors likely to facilitate or undermine the implementation of these different strategies. With this framework as a guide, we then examine the strategic use of economic interdependence—focusing in particular on economic engagement—in three East Asian States: South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan. We use these case studies to draw conclusions about the underlying factors that facilitate the use of a strategy of economic engagement, that determine the particular type of engagement strategy used, and that help to predict the likelihood of success. Because our conclusions are primarily derived inductively from a small number of cases, we are cautious in making claims of generalizability. Nonetheless, it is our hope that the narratives we provide and the conclusions that we draw from them will help to spur further research into this interesting yet under-studied subject. ECONOMIC ENGAGMENT: STRATEGIES AND EXPECTATIONS Scholars have usefully distinguished between two types of economic engagement: conditional policies that require an explicit quid-pro-quo on the part of the target country, and policies that are unconditional. Conditional policies, sometimes called “linkage” or economic “carrots,” are the inverse of economic sanctions. Instead of threatening a target country with a sanction absent a change in policy, conditional engagement policies promise increased economic flows in exchange for policy change. Drezner’s (1999/2000) analysis of conditional economic inducements yields a set of highly plausible expectations concerning when conditional strategies are likely to be employed, and when they are likely to succeed. Specifically, he suggests that reasons exist to believe, a priori, that policies of conditional engagement will be less prevalent than economic sanctions. First, economic coercion is costly if it fails (sanctions are only carried out if the target country fails to change policy), while conditional engagement is costly if it succeeds (economic payoffs are delivered only if the target country does change policy). Second, states may be reluctant to offer economic inducements with adversaries with whom they expect long-term conflict, as this may undermine their resolve in the eyes of their opponent while also making the opponent stronger. Third, the potential for market failure in an anarchic international setting looms large: both the initiating and the target states must be capable of making a credible commitment to uphold their end of the bargain. These factors lead Drezner to hypothesize that the use of economic carrots is most likely to occur and succeed between democracies (because democracies are better able to make credible commitments than non-democracies), within the context of international regimes (because such regimes reduce the transactions costs of market exchange), and, among adversaries, only after coercive threats are first used. Unconditional engagement strategies are more passive in that they do not include a specific quid-pro-quo. Rather, countries deploy economic links with an adversary in the hopes that economic interdependence itself will, over time, effect change in the target’s foreign policy behavior and yield a reduced threat of military conflict at the bilateral level. How increased commercial and/or financial integration at the bilateral level might yield an improved bilateral political environment is not obvious. While most empirical studies on the subject find that increased economic ties tend to be associated with a reduced likelihood of military violence, no consensus exists regarding how such effects are realized. At a minimum, two causal pathways exist that state leaders might seek to exploit by pursuing a policy of unconditional engagement: economic interdependence can act as a constraint on the foreign policy behavior of the target state, and economic interdependence can act as a transforming agent that helps to reshape the goals of the target state. Perhaps the most widely accepted theoretical link between economic integration and a reduced danger of military violence centers on the constraints imposed on state behavior by increasing economic exchange. Once established, a disruption in economic relations between countries would be costly on two levels. First, firms might lose assets that could not readily be redeployed elsewhere. For example, direct investments cannot easily be moved, and may be lost (i.e. seized or destroyed) if war breaks out. Second, firms engaged in bilateral economic exchange would be forced to search for next-best alternatives, which could impose significant costs on an economy as a whole if bilateral commercial ties are extensive. In short, economic interdependence makes war more costly, meaning that states will be less likely to initiate armed conflict against countries with which they are integrated economically. Constraining effects of economic interdependence may also arise more indirectly: as economic integration between two countries increases, an increasing number of economic actors within those two countries benefit directly from bilateral economic ties, who in turn are likely to support—and lobby for—stable bilateral political relations. Economic integration, in other words, creates vested interests in peace (Hirschman 1945; Russett and Oneal 2001; Levy 2003). These interests are likely to become more influential as economic ties grow (Rogowski 1989), suggesting that leaders will pay increasing domestic political costs for implementing policies that destabilize bilateral political relations. Domestic political institutions might act as important intervening variables here. For example, these effects may be most likely to take effect in democracies, which provide actors who benefit from trade clear paths through which to influence the political process (Papayoanou 1999; Gelpi and Grieco 2003; Russett and Oneal 2001). Democracies, of course, likely vary in the influence they give to commercial interests, as do authoritarian polities (e.g. Papayoanou and Kastner 1999/2000). Recently, scholars have questioned whether the increased costs of military conflict associated with economic interdependence necessarily act as a constraint on state leaders. Indeed, without further assumptions, the effects appear indeterminate: while economic interdependence increases the costs of conflict for the target state, it also increases those costs for the engaging state. On the one hand, increased costs for the target might make it less willing to provoke conflict, but on the other hand, the increased costs for the engaging state may paradoxically embolden the target state, believing it could get away with more before provoking a strong response (Morrow 1999, 2003; Gartzke 2003; Gartzke et al. 2001). This critique suggests that for an unconditional engagement policy exploiting the constraining effects of economic interdependence to work, leaders in the target state must value the benefits afforded by economic integration more than leaders in the initiating state (on this point, see also Abdelal and Kirshner 1999/2000). Such asymmetry is most likely to arise when the target state’s economy depends more heavily on bilateral economic exchange than the sending state (Hirschman 1945), and when domestic political institutions in the target state give the benefactors of bilateral exchange considerable political influence (Papayoanou and Kastner 1999/2000). The second mechanism through which economic interdependence might effect improved political relations centers on elite transformation that reshapes state strategies. This transformation can be defined as both an elevation at the national level of goals of economic welfare (and a concurrent devaluation of the old values of military status and territorial acquisition) and a systemic transformation of values away from the military orientation of the Westphalian order. Such arguments have a long heritage, including both Joseph Schumpeter's analysis of imperialism as an atavism that would be superseded by more pacific bourgeois values, and interwar idealists, who sometimes based their arguments on the material transformations underway in the international system. How economic interdependence creates transformed (and more pacific) elites is less clear. Learning may take place at the individual level—the cases of Mikhail Gorbachev and Deng Xiaoping come to mind—but such learning must often take place before policy encourages increased interdependence. Processes of creating shared values and identity and economic influences on broader social learning are more difficult to trace. A different and perhaps more plausible transformational route follows from the vested interests argument outlined above. What appears to be social learning is in effect coalitional change: internationalist elites committed to economic openness and international stability supplant or marginalize nationalist elites wedded to the threat or use of military force. Whether a society is a pluralist democracy or not, interests tied to the international economy become a critical part of the selectorate to whom political elites must respond. Etel Solingen (1998) outlines such a model of transformation in regional orders when strong internationalist coalitions committed to economic liberalization create zones of stable peace. The barriers to a successful unconditional engagement strategy that aims to achieve elite transformation in the target state would appear substantial. Strategies in this vein are likely to encounter substantial resistance in the target state: most elites probably don’t want to be “transformed,” and they certainly don’t want to be replaced. Faced with likely resistance, initiating states pursuing this strategy must be prepared to open economic links unilaterally (i.e. without the cooperation of the target), hoping that the prospect of bilateral economic ties will generate a latent coalition of groups desiring a peaceful environment in which they could take advantage of those ties, and that eventually a political entrepreneur will mobilize this latent coalition in an effort to challenge the existing order. Because transformational strategies may require long time horizons and may also incur repeated disappointments, they are perhaps most likely to be successful when a broad and stable consensus—one able to withstand changes in governing party—exists within the country initiating such a strategy (see, for example, Davis 1999). In summary, we have distinguished between three types of economic engagement: conditional engagement (linkage); unconditional engagement seeking to utilize the constraining effects of economic interdependence; and unconditional engagement seeking to utilize the transforming effects of economic interdependence. We have also outlined a number of expectations, mostly drawn from the existing literature, regarding the conditions likely to facilitate the use of these various strategies. In the remainder of this essay we examine the engagement policies of South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan, and we use these cases to draw conclusions concerning the conditions facilitating the strategic use of economic interdependence.

## race k

**White supremacy isn’t a monolithic root cause---proximate causes determined through empirics are more likely---and their arg shuts off productive debate over solutions
Shelby 7** – Tommie Shelby, Professor of African and African American Studies and of Philosophy at Harvard, 2007, We Who Are Dark: The Philosophical Foundations of Black Solidarity

Others might challenge the distinction between ideological and structural causes of black disadvantage, on the grounds that we are rarely, if ever, able to so neatly separate these factors, an epistemic situation that is only made worse by the fact that these causes interact in complex ways with behavioral factors. These distinctions, while perhaps straightforward in the abstract, are difficult to employ in practice. For example, it would be difficult, if not impossible, for the members of a poor black community to determine with any accuracy whether their impoverished condition is due primarily to institutional racism, the impact of past racial injustice, the increasing technological basis of the economy, shrinking state budgets, the vicissitudes of world trade, the ascendancy of conservative ideology, poorly funded schools, lack of personal initiative, a violent drug trade that deters business investment, some combination of these factors, or some other explanation altogether. Moreover, it is notoriously difficult to determine when the formulation of putatively race-neutral policies has been motivated by racism or when such policies are unfairly applied by racially biased public officials.
There are very real empirical difficulties in determining the specific causal significance of the factors that create and perpetuate black disadvantage; nonetheless, it is clear that these factors exist and that justice will demand different practical remedies according to each factor's relative impact on blacks' life chances. We must acknowledge that our social world is complicated and not immediately transparent to common sense, and thus that systematic empirical inquiry, historical studies, and rigorous social analysis are required to reveal its systemic structure and sociocultural dynamic

s. There is, moreover, no mechanical or infallible procedure for determining which analyses are the soundest ones. In addition, given the inevitable bias that attends social inquiry, legislators and those they represent cannot simply defer to social-scientific experts. We must instead rely on open public debate—among politicians, scholars, policy makers, intellectuals, and ordinary citizens—with the aim of garnering rationally motivated and informed consensus. And even if our practical decision procedures rest on critical deliberative discourse and thus live up to our highest democratic ideals, some trial and error through actual practice is unavoidable.
These difficulties and complications notwithstanding, a general recognition of the distinctions among the ideological and structural causes of black disadvantage could help blacks refocus their political energies and self-help strategies. Attention to these distinctions might help expose the superficiality of theories that seek to reduce all the social obstacles that blacks face to contemporary forms of racism or white supremacy. A more penetrating, subtle, and empirically grounded analysis is needed to comprehend the causes of racial inequality and black disadvantage. Indeed, these distinctions highlight the necessity to probe deeper to find the causes of contemporary forms of racism, as some racial conflict may be a symptom of broader problems or recent social developments (such as immigration policy or reduced federal funding for higher education).

**3) All lives infinitely valuable—only ethical option is maximizing number saved**

**Cummisky, 96** (David, professor of philosophy at Bates, Kantian Consequentialism, p. 131)

Finally, even if one grants that saving two persons with dignity cannot outweigh and compensate for killing one—because dignity cannot be added and summed this way—this point still does not justify deontological constraints. On the extreme interpretation, why would not killing one person be a stronger obligation than saving two persons? If I am concerned with the priceless dignity of each, it would seem that I may still save two; it is just that my reason cannot be that the two compensate for the loss of one. Consider Hill’s example of a priceless object: If I can save two of three priceless statutes only by destroying one, then I cannot claim that saving two is not outweighed by the one that was not destroyed. Indeed, even if dignity cannot be simply summed up, how is the extreme interpretation inconsistent with the idea that I should save as many priceless objects as possible? Even if two do not simply outweigh and thus compensate for the loss of one, each is priceless; thus, I have good reason to save as many as I can. In short, it is not clear how the extreme interpretation justifies the ordinary killing/letting-die distinction or even how it conflicts with the conclusion that the more persons with dignity who are saved, the better.

## india cp

**Venezuela is key—reacted against investment with highest intensity**

**Gomez 10**—a Professor of Law at the University of Zaragoza (Katia Fach, July, “Latin America and ICSID: David versus Goliath?”) EL

As it has been pointed out throughout this paper, Latin America224 is currently going back to approaches that belong to the Calvo doctrine.225 This stance is considered to be beneficial by these countries, as the Calvo doctrine fosters the region’s independence from the United States and strengthens Latin American sovereignty and regionalism. Nevertheless, it must be taken into account that Latin America is not a harmonious bloc.226 This is demonstrated through a number of factors, including its level of development, its political allies and its economic policies.227 While some countries of Latin America continue to develop liberal economic policies (Chile, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, and Colombia), others (Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador) have shown their reluctance to conform to this model, and are adopting a different model of economic regulation.228 The first set of neo-liberal proposals is based on free market access, institutional efficiency, and investor protection, while, on the other hand, the anti-Free Trade Agreement countries rely on a strong state, capable of creating wealth through its control over natural resources and the economy.229 A clear example of the important differences that exist within this region are the many recent clashes between Hugo Chavez and Alvaro Uribe, president of Venezuela and former president of Colombia, respectively.230 Both leaders represent the various tendencies that coexist, and sometimes collide, within Latin America. Similar conclusions can be drawn if we analyze the specific sector of investment arbitration in Latin America. On the one hand, this paper has shown that in recent years there have been many conflicts in this field. Due to a wide number of cited reasons, the system established by ICSID has been considered detrimental by the countries of Latin America. On the other hand, despite this general anti-ICSID sentiment in Latin America, each nation is developing its own position according to its socio-political characteristics. The countries examined most thoroughly in this paper are: Argentina, Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia. Argentina’s resistance to ICSID is a result of a series of ICSID awards issued against the 43country as a consequence of an economic crisis that Argentina has considered to be a state of necessity.231 On the other hand, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia have leftist regimes, which can be considered politically volatile232 by powers like the United States.233 The control of valuable natural resources has become a national issue in these countries.234 From their perspective, the exploitation of these resources by foreign companies shows the abuse committed by the first world in Latin America. As a part of their “retaliation campaign”, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia are developing a series of initiatives aimed at eliminating ICSID as a forum for resolving international investment disputes.235 This paper has analyzed in detail these initiatives and their legal implications including the following: (1) resorting to the Constitution to ignore ICSID awards, (2) promoting national courts’ reactions against ICSID, (3) drafting international contracts that avoid ICSID arbitration, (4) withdrawing from the ICSID Convention, (5) using Bilateral Investment Treaties to combat ICSID, (6) creating national agencies to react against ICSID arbitrations, and (7) developing a regional arbitration center aimed at replacing ICSID. Within this more reactionary bloc, there are also differences in the intensity of the nations’ responses and there is some precedent for international investment disputes between South American countries that, theoretically, share approaches.236 At this time, the most radical position is that taken by Venezuela .237 In recent months, President Chavez expropriated several foreign companies operating in key sectors of the country,238 “and created a joint venture with Russia to drill for heavy crude oil in Venezuela’s Orinoco River Basin.”239 Chavez also announced his intention to withdraw Venezuela from the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights after this organization accused him of endangering democracy in Venezuela.240 This kind of news certainly worries the international community and investors, particularly those in the United States and Europe.

**Venezuela exited the ICSID in hopes of creating its own regional alternatives**

**De Cordoba 11**—reporter for Wall Street Journal (“Chávez Takes Steps to Exit Global Forum”, 9/13, Jose, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111903285704576560760106674594.html>) EL

President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela has taken steps to pull out of the global forum most used to settle investor disputes, where Caracas faces more than $40 billion in claims for nationalized properties. Enlarge Image VENEZUALA Reuters Documents show that Mr. Chávez, shown in August, is moving to avoid financial sanctions from abroad. Venezuelan officials have drawn up plans, at Mr. Chávez's order, to withdraw from the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, or ICSID, a unit of the World Bank in Washington, according to recent documents reviewed by The Wall Street Journal. A withdrawal would be the latest in a series of actions Mr. Chávez has taken to protect Venezuela's international assets from possible seizure by foreign governments and now, perhaps, creditors. Last month, Caracas announced it would transfer $6 billion in cash reserves held in European and U.S. banks to Russian, Chinese and Brazilian banks. Mr. Chávez also said he would move some 211 tons of gold valued at $11 billion held in foreign banks to Venezuela's Central Bank vault in Caracas. Venezuelan government documents say the main reason for those actions was to avoid financial sanctions by the international community, such as those that have frozen billions of dollars of Libyan government funds under Moammar Gadhafi's Libyan regime. Enlarge Image VENEZUELA Analysts peg Mr. Chávez's fears to the possibility Venezuela could have to pay billions of dollars in compensation from companies that have had assets expropriated, or that future unrest in Venezuela could lead to international sanctions. Venezuela's withdrawal from the ICSID also would fit well the nationalistic bent that has led Mr. Chávez to expropriate 988 companies, 401 so far this year, according to Conindustria, a Venezuela industry chamber. "It's pure demagogy," said Roberto Dañino, a former head of the ICSID. "Venezuela would like investors to submit themselves to national tribunals where there are no guarantees or due process." The Venezuelan Embassy in Washington declined to comment. Lawyers at Arnold & Porter LLP and Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mosle LLP, the two principal firms that Venezuela uses to defend itself from claimants at the ICSID, declined to comment. A Venezuelan foreign ministry official said the country wasn't considering withdrawing from ICSID now, though he acknowledged meetings on the subject had been held. Another Venezuelan official countered that the move was, in fact, now being debated by high-ranking officials. Lawyers familiar with ICSID procedures say a Venezuelan withdrawal wouldn't have any impact on the 18 claims that Venezuela now faces at the World Bank unit. For starters, it would only take effect six months after notice is given to the center, said Dietmar W. Prager, a lawyer with the New York firm of Debevoise & Plimpton LLP who has represented investors with ICSID disputes with Venezuela. Further, bilateral investment treaties bind Venezuela to ICSID arbitration for a period, depending on the treaty, from between 10 to 15 years after the cancellation of an agreement, according to lawyers and Venezuela's own documents. "The Venezuelans can't say I'm taking my marbles and going home," said Michael Nolan, a lawyer at the Washington office of Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy LLP, who has represented clients with Venezuelan claims at the ICSID. Eventually, the government papers say, Venezuela's goal is to replace ICSID with a dispute-settlement mechanism that would fit within the framework of Latin American integration groups such as the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas or the Union of South American Nations, which were either founded by or heavily influenced by Caracas. "It may be a combination to play to the balcony and make Chávez appear as a regional leader leading an attempt to gut the international investment protection system," said James Lloyd Loftis, who heads law firm Vinson & Elkins's international dispute resolution practice. A withdrawal would send an unfriendly signal about Venezuela's policy towards foreign investment, Mr. Prager said. To be sure, foreign investors have already gotten the message, as foreign companies have been taking more assets out of the country than they have been putting in it. Foreign direct investment was a negative $3.1 billion in 2009 and a negative $1.4 billion in 2010, according to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. At ICSID, companies lining up to seek compensation from Venezuela range from oil giants to gold mining companies, and include some of the world's largest cement manufacturers. ConocoPhillips by far has the largest claim. The oil company wants to recover $30 billion in compensation for stakes in two projects in the Orinoco heavy oil fields, according to Reuters. Another oil giant, Exxon Mobil Corp., has cut its claim for compensation to $7 billion for Mr. Chávez's 2007 seizure of a heavy crude project from an initial $12 billion, Venezuela said last year. An Exxon spokesman declined to comment. Mexican cement maker Cemex and Swiss cement maker Holcim are seeking compensation for Mr. Chávez' seizure of their plants in 2008 as part of the Venezuelan government nationalization of the country's cement industry. Holcim recently reached a $650 million settlement with Venezuela. The Swiss company has temporarily suspended its legal action depending on whether Venezuela complies with the terms of the settlement, said a person knowledgeable about the case. Cemex's action is ongoing. This year, Crystallex, a Canadian gold miner, filed an action seeking $3.8 billion in compensation for the government's unilateral termination of a giant gold mining project. A spokesman for Crystallex said the company's legal action wouldn't be affected if Venezuela were to withdraw from ICSID. Since 2007, Mr. Chávez has publicly contemplated a pullout from the ICSID. Some of his closest allies have already left. Bolivia pulled out in 2007 and Ecuador followed suit in 2009. Lawyers familiar with arbitration disputes say their withdrawal from ICSID pullout has not had any noticeable impact on claims against the two countries. Venezuelan documents show that withdrawing from the ICSID would only start a complex and difficult process. Caracas would have to renegotiate bilateral investment protection treaties with 23 nations, including European countries to allies including Iran and Russia.

## adv cp

**Geo-Engineering fails**

**Moriarty and Honnery ’10** – Both PhDs

Patrick Moriarty, Ph.D. Department of Design, Monash University, and Damon Honnery, Ph.D. Department of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering, Monash University. “Why Technical Fixes Won’t Mitigate Climate Change”. Journal of Cosmology, 2010, Vol 8, 1921-1927. http://journalofcosmology.com/ClimateChange107.html

As discussed here, geoengineering is action intended to manipulate climate on a global, or at least regional, scale. Corner and Pidgeon (2010) have pointed out that our emissions of CO2 (which have raised atmospheric CO2 levels from the pre-industrial 280 ppm to the present 387 ppm) could also be considered geoengineering. If so, we are merely arguing about different forms of the practice. The potential use of geoengineering for climate mitigation received a boost with a paper by Nobel laureate Paul Crutzen (2006). Like the present authors, he argued that conventional methods of mitigation were not working—the CO2 atmospheric concentration continues to climb at about 2 ppm each year. His inspiration was the significant drop in global temperatures recorded in the year following the Mount Pinatubo volcanic eruption in the Philippines in June 1991. The cooling resulted from the emission of some 10 Mt of sulphate aerosols into the lower stratosphere in the tropics. Continuous deliberate placement of fine sulphate aerosols in the lower stratosphere would reflect some of the incoming short-wave solar radiation, increasing the Earth’s albedo, and counteracting the positive forcing from increased levels of GHGs. The options available for geoengineering can be either local in extent (such as altering the albedo of deserts, crops or urban areas) or global (such as the use of giant space-based mirrors). Only aerosol placement in the tropical stratosphere, albedo enhancement of marine stratiform clouds and reflective mirrors in space would have the potential to counteract a doubling or more of atmospheric CO2 ppm (Lenton and Vaughan 2009). Of these global approaches, the cheapest is likely to be aerosol placement. Except for space-based mirrors, the approaches appear both far cheaper and far faster to implement than more conventional mitigation methods. Because of the lack of progress in slowing emissions and the low cost and rapid cooling resulting from global measures, geoengineering is gaining acceptance. The U.K. Royal Society (2009) has endorsed it as a technique to be used alongside other mitigation methods. But implementing measures to reduce the planetary albedo run enormous risks. Global precipitation would on average be reduced—it is not possible to bring both global temperatures and precipitation to their previous levels (Bala 2009). Acidification of the oceans would continue, potentially destabilising ocean ecosystems (Doney et al. 2009). Also, because elevated levels of CO2 will persist for centuries, so too must geoengineering—the continuous placement of aerosols, for example. Any abrupt cessation because of dangerous side effects discovered would rapidly raise the forcing to levels corresponding to the GHG concentrations at that time, resulting in very rapid warming, with possibly catastrophic effects on ecosystems (Matthews and Caldeira 2007). Thus although the costs of aerosol placement may well be modest, the overall cost of countering the unwanted consequences could be very high. Recently, perhaps because of these serious drawbacks, some researchers have modelled the effects of more modest aerosol placement schemes. Rather than global year-round aerosol coverage, they have looked at techniques that might prevent melting of the Greenhouse ice cap or Arctic summer sea ice, or summer warming of the north Atlantic during the hurricane season (Caldeira and Wood 2008, MacCracken 2009). The aerosols might be locally applied, for part of the year, to address a very specific problem resulting from climate change. But to be effective, their effects would necessarily be felt globally (Caldeira and Wood 2008), and if several of these projects were to be implemented simultaneously, the combined gobal effects might be extremely uncertain.

## ptx- rr

**Won’t pass – base opposition and no moderates**

**Gandelman, 9/18**/13 – (Joe, “Republicans all in: government shutdown by Repubicans virtually certain” <http://themoderatevoice.com/186749/republicans-all-in-government-shutdown-by-repubicans-virtually-certain/>)

It’s going to happen. You can bet on it. Republicans now seem all in – despite some pesky noises from they-must-be-RINO websites such as the Wall Street Journal and the National Review about the dangers — to set the stage for a government shut down. And don’t be surprised if it then gets worse and House Republicans engineer a default on the debt ceiling as well:

House Republicans are moving forward with a government funding bill that would defund ObamaCare.

The legislation is a nod to House conservatives, some of whom quickly backed the plan.

But Senate Democrats and the White House have promised to reject any legislation that would defund the healthcare law, meaning the legislation won’t move farther than the House.

Unless the House and Senate can agree on legislation and get it to the White House by Oct. 1, the government will shut down at that time.

Basically, the GOP House leadership is politically twerking its powerful Tea Party sympathetic members. But the consquences to many Americans that even a brief shutdown would bring could be huge.

And who says this will necessarily be a brief shutdown?

The House measure would keep the government funded through Dec. 15 at the current $986 billion spending rate, rather than the lower $967 billion level called for in the 2011 Budget Control Act.

GOP leaders also announced Wednesday that they will condition a debt ceiling increase on a one-year delay of ObamaCare, approval of the Keystone XL pipeline and an outline for tax reform.

In other words:

Republicans are going to use political extortion — hurting the United States’s economy — if they can’t get policies that they are unable to get by winning elections or putting together coalitions in Congress. It’s a tough choice for Barack Obama and the Democrats: if this is allowed to happen it will fundamentally change the form of American democracy.

Republican Study Committee Chairman Steve Scalise (R-La.) said he was on board with the plan despite the higher spending level.

“This reflects the principles we’ve been pushing for,” he said. “We want to address ObamaCare directly in the CR. We want to address ObamaCare in the debt ceiling and this keeps both of those moving.”

Yes — in a way unprecedented in American democracy. And:

Rep. Tom Graves (R-Ga.), who authored a one-year CR that would increase defense spending while defunding ObamaCare, said he would vote for the new Boehner plan.

“It’s a step in the right direction,” Graves said. “The American people should view this as a victory.”

I agree with Booman: there is a notable lack of adults in the Republican room, and a notably large number of conservative talk show host followers and Tea Party members. Booman:

It’s a two-pronged approach. On the continuing resolution (CR) to fund the government, the Republicans will limit the funding to December 15th. The funding level will be slightly above what the Budget Control Act of 2011 calls for. And it will defund ObamaCare.

On the debt ceiling, they will have a separate vote that will delay ObamaCare for a year, authorize the Keystone XL pipeline, and provide an outline for tax reform.

Their hope is that they can successfully pass the buck to Republican senators who will be expected to sustain a filibuster against any CR or debt ceiling hike that includes money for health care.

It really doesn’t matter whether the Senate Republicans go along with the plan or not, because the government will shut down either way and we will default on our debts either way.

The pressure on Republican senators will be intense, but they’d rather let the House take the blame for the catastrophe.

The fact that the Senate Minority Leader, Mitch McConnell, is facing a primary challenge from his right makes it unlikely that he will ride to the House’s rescue this time around. If we’re hoping for adult leadership in the Senate, it will have to come from a rump of moderate Republican senators that doesn’t seem to exist.

**Engagement with Venezuela popular in Congress – Chavez’s death changed the equation.**

**Spetalnick ‘13**

Matt Spetalnick – White House correspondent who has covered news on four continents for Reuters, from Latin American coups and drug wars – Reuter’s – March 6th, 2013 – “Despite new hopes, U.S. treads cautiously after death of Venezuela's Chavez” – http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/03/06/uk-venezuela-chavez-usa-idUKBRE92504920130306

Washington's challenge will be to figure out how far to go in seizing the opening to engage with Venezuelan leaders as well as its political opposition without giving the impression of U.S. meddling following the socialist president's death after a two-year battle with cancer. "We're not interested in having a confrontational relationship with Venezuela," a senior U.S. official told Reuters. "We're going to have to see how things evolve. It's a dynamic period." For Washington, a major test will be whether Venezuela follows its own constitution - which has been widely interpreted to require a special election to pick Chavez's successor - and if such a vote is conducted in a free and fair way in "accordance with hemispheric norms," the official said. Washington had accused Chavez and his allies of electoral abuses, such as intimidating foes and misusing state media during his 14-year rule. Chavez had created headaches for successive U.S. administrations with his strong anti-American rhetoric and his alliances with some of Washington's main foes, including Cuba and Iran. The question now is whether his leftist "revolution" and incendiary foreign policy can live on without his dominant personality at the helm. In a normally divided Washington, Chavez's death brought a rare moment of bipartisan agreement, with Republicans and Democrats alike seeing it as a chance to turn a page after a long period of strained U.S.-Venezuelan ties.

**Prefer qualified evidence – PC doesn’t influence Congress**

**Dickinson 9** professor of political science at Middlebury College (Matthew, “Sotomayor, Obama and Presidential Power,” May 26, 2009 Presidential Power <http://blogs.middlebury.edu/presidentialpower/2009/05/26/sotamayor-obama-and-presidential-power/>]

What is of more interest to me, however, is what her selection reveals about the basis of presidential power. Political scientists, like baseball writers evaluating hitters, have devised numerous means of measuring a president’s influence in Congress. I will devote a separate post to discussing these, but in brief, they often center on the creation of legislative “box scores” designed to measure how many times a president’s preferred piece of legislation, or nominee to the executive branch or the courts, is approved by Congress. That is, how many pieces of legislation that the president supports actually pass Congress? How often do members of Congress vote with the president’s preferences? How often is a president’s policy position supported by roll call outcomes? These measures, however, are a misleading gauge of presidential power – they are a better indicator of congressional power. This is because how members of Congress vote on a nominee or legislative item is rarely influenced by anything a president does. Although journalists (and political scientists) often focus on the legislative “endgame” to gauge presidential influence – will the President swing enough votes to get his preferred legislation enacted? – this mistakes an outcome with actual evidence of presidential influence. Once we control for other factors – a member of Congress’ ideological and partisan leanings, the political leanings of her constituency, whether she’s up for reelection or not – we can usually predict how she will vote without needing to know much of anything about what the president wants. (I am ignoring the importance of a president’s veto power for the moment.) Despite the much publicized and celebrated instances of presidential arm-twisting during the legislative endgame, then, most legislative outcomes don’t depend on presidential lobbying. But this is not to say that presidents lack influence. Instead, the primary means by which presidents influence what Congress does is through their ability to determine the alternatives from which Congress must choose. That is, presidential power is largely an exercise in agenda-setting – not arm-twisting. And we see this in the Sotomayer nomination. Barring a major scandal, she will almost certainly be confirmed to the Supreme Court whether Obama spends the confirmation hearings calling every Senator or instead spends the next few weeks ignoring the Senate debate in order to play Halo III on his Xbox. That is, how senators decide to vote on Sotomayor will have almost nothing to do with Obama’s lobbying from here on in (or lack thereof). His real influence has already occurred, in the decision to present Sotomayor as his nominee. If we want to measure Obama’s “power”, then, we need to know what his real preference was and why he chose Sotomayor. My guess – and it is only a guess – is that after conferring with leading Democrats and Republicans, he recognized the overriding practical political advantages accruing from choosing an Hispanic woman, with left-leaning credentials. We cannot know if this would have been his ideal choice based on judicial philosophy alone, but presidents are never free to act on their ideal preferences. Politics is the art of the possible. Whether Sotomayer is his first choice or not, however, her nomination is a reminder that the power of the presidency often resides in the president’s ability to dictate the alternatives from which Congress (or in this case the Senate) must choose. Although Republicans will undoubtedly attack Sotomayor for her judicial “activism” (citing in particular her decisions regarding promotion and affirmative action), her comments regarding the importance of gender and ethnicity in influencing her decisions, and her views regarding whether appellate courts “make” policy, they run the risk of alienating Hispanic voters – an increasingly influential voting bloc (to the extent that one can view Hispanics as a voting bloc!) I find it very hard to believe she will not be easily confirmed. In structuring the alternative before the Senate in this manner, then, Obama reveals an important aspect of presidential power that cannot be measured through legislative boxscores.

**PC isn’t key to the debt ceiling**

**Klein, 9/18**/13 - columnist at the Washington Post, as well as a contributor to MSNBC. His work focuses on domestic and economic policymaking,(Ezra, Washington Post, “The White House doesn’t think it can prevent a government shutdown” <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/09/18/the-white-house-doesnt-think-it-can-prevent-a-government-shutdown/>)

And there is a difference between 2011 and 2013. Two of them, in fact.

1) In 2011, the White House knew whom to deal with. Back then, House Speaker John Boehner actually did seem reasonably in sync with his party on these issues, and so the White House was able to negotiate with Republican leadership on a deal. Today, the relevant negotiations are happening in the Republican Party, with GOP leadership trying to fight conservatives who want to shut down the government, and no one knows who actually has the power to cut and close a deal.

2) In 2011, the White House was willing to deal. The White House believed, in its gut, that Republicans had been given a mandate in the 2010 elections to extract exactly the kind of concessions they were demanding. In addition, the White House believed President Obama would be a likelier bet for reelection if he could cut a "grand bargain" with the newly resurgent Republicans, taking their key issue away from them.

This year, it's the White House that won the last election, and so they see no popular legitimacy behind Republican demands. In addition, they are deeply, fervently committed to the proposition that they will never again negotiate around the debt ceiling, as that's a tactic history will judge them harshly for repeatedly enabling. So even if Boehner could cut a deal on the debt ceiling, the White House isn't open to negotiating.

All of which helps explain the White House's more alarmist communications strategy. In 2011, the White House was confident they could cut a deal with Republicans and, in some ways, eager to do so. That gave them a sense of control over the situation.

This year, they're not willing to cut a deal with the Republicans on the debt ceiling, and they're not sure the Republicans can cut a deal with themselves on funding the government, all of which means the White House doesn't have much control over this situation. That's why they're trying to worry business and Wall Street and other outside actors who could put pressure on the GOP.

**Winners win—Bush proves**

**Fortier 9** [John, Research Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, January 14th, Spend Your Political Capital Before It's Gone, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0109/17395.html]

Bush came into the presidency after a protracted election dispute but acted like a man with a mandate. His election victory, no matter how small, was a form of political capital to be spent, and he pushed his tax and education reform packages through Congress. After the Sept. 11 attacks, Republican victories in the 2002 midterm election and the initial phase of the Iraq war, Bush gained more political capital. And each time, he spent it, going to Congress for more tax cuts, the creation of a Department of Homeland Security and other domestic priorities. Bush developed the image of a winner. Despite narrow Republican majorities in Congress, he succeeded in holding his party together and pulling out one legislative victory after another. He famously did not veto a bill in his first term. Even when Bush veered from a typical conservative agenda on education reform and Medicare prescription drugs, Republicans voted with him, although some held their noses. Republicans in Congress did not want to break the string of Bush’s first-term legislative juggernaut. Bush was spending his political capital and, by winning, was getting repaid. Bush’s 2004 reelection was the apex of his presidency. He won a spirited, high- turnout contest by a clear margin, he brought more Republicans to Congress, and he was ready to spend his latest cache of political capital on two big domestic priorities: Social Security reform and tax reform. But 2005 saw Bush lose all of his political capital. His domestic priorities were bold, but he had overreached and did not have plans that Congress could get to work on immediately. The legislative vacuum in Congress stood in contrast to Bush’s first term, where Congress was almost always busy at work on Bush priorities. More importantly, conditions in Iraq deteriorated, and the public began to lose confidence in the president and his ability to win the war. Bush himself said that he had spent his political capital in Iraq and had lost it there. Republican scandals and the president’s lack of leadership immediately after Hurricane Katrina further damaged Bush. The winning streak was over, the president’s job approval numbers had dropped and his days setting the legislative agenda were over. Even though Bush had his biggest Republican majorities in the 109th Congress, Republican leaders staked out their own agenda, not wanting to tie themselves to a now unpopular president. Bush never regained political capital after 2005. Ronald Reagan had early heady days when he controlled the agenda; his popularity waned, but he was able to regain his footing. Bill Clinton famously bounced from highs to lows and back again. But for Bush, there was no second act. Reagan and Clinton could counterpunch and thrive as president without control of Congress. The Bush presidency had only two settings: on and off. In his first term, Bush controlled the legislative agenda like a prime minister; in the second, others set the agenda. President-elect Barack Obama won election more convincingly than Bush, and he will have larger congressional majorities than Republicans had. No doubt he will begin with some political capital of his own. But as the Bush presidency has taught us, that capital will run out someday, and a real test of leadership will be how Obama adjusts.

**No default impact – it’s political hype**

**Boccia, 9/18**/13 – fellow in federal budgetary affairs at the Heritage Foundation (Romina, “Debt Limit: Options and the Way Forward” <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/09/debt-limit-options-and-the-way-forward>)

If Congress does not raise the debt limit by mid-October, the Treasury would not necessarily default on debt obligations. Even while cash-strapped, the Treasury can reasonably be expected to prioritize principal and interest payments on the national debt, protecting the full faith and credit of the United States above all other spending. It is almost impossible to conceive that the Treasury and the President would choose to default on debt obligations because doing so would have damaging economic consequences.

Nevertheless, the Treasury and the President have repeatedly invoked the threat of default to pressure Congress into raising the debt ceiling without substantial spending cuts and policy reforms. In July, Secretary Lew said on ABC’s This Week: “Congress can’t let us default. Congress has to do its work.”[6] On August 26, he wrote to Congress: “Congress should act as soon as possible to protect America’s good credit by extending normal borrowing authority well before any risk of default becomes imminent.”[7] President Obama also mentioned default at the G-20 summit: “That includes making sure we don’t risk a U.S. default over paying bills we’ve already racked up.”[8 ]

**We control uniqueness – the US has no influence now**

**Stowcroft 4/25** – [Brent, the president and founder of the Scowcroft Group, served as national-security adviser to presidents Gerald Ford and George H. W. Bush, member of The National Interest’s Advisory Council, “A World in Transformation,” http://nationalinterest.org/article/world-transformation-6794?page=1]

Since the end of World War II, the United States has been the country that could take the lead in moving the world from drift to transition and perhaps even to a new global order. The shining example is the immediate post–World War II period. But America is not as well positioned to do that now. The 9/11 attacks were a watershed experience for us. They were a wake-up call that jolted us from the relative calm of the 1990s, when the country basked in the notion that it did not have to think much about foreign policy. Afterward, it became clear that we had to think a great deal about foreign policy. That led to an anomalous decade that has changed how we think about the world and altered our image in the world. Once, we were viewed as trying to do what was best for everybody; now, we are seen as being preoccupied with our own narrow interests. We have appeared sometimes to be seeking to dominate rather than to lead. As a result, it is not as easy as it used to be to get nations to mobilize in the same direction. And that retards our ability to navigate through this time of chaos and transition.

# aff vs niles west

## warming

**Global warming will reach a tipping point within the decade – positive feedbacks would raise sea levels, threaten food security, collapse states, and end civilization**

**Brown 8** – Professor @ CAS

Lester E. Brown, Director and Founder of the global institute of Environment in the U.S., “Plan B 3.0: Mobilizing to Save Civilization,” Factiva

In 2004, Stephen Pacala and Robert Socolow at Princeton Uni­versity published an article in Science that showed how annual carbon emissions from fossil fuels could be held at 7 billion tons instead of rising to 14 billion tons over the next 50 years, as would occur with business as usual. The goal of Pacala, an ecol­ogist, and Socolow, an engineer, was to prevent atmospheric CO2 concentrations, then near 375 ppm, from rising above 500 ppm. I They described IS ways, all using proven technologies, that by 20S4 could each cut carbon emissions by 1 billion tons per year. Any seven of these options could be used together to pre­vent an increase in carbon emissions through 2054. Pacala and Socolow further theorize that advancing technology would allow for annual carbon emissions to be cut to 2 billion tons by 2104, a level that can be absorbed by natural carbon sinks in land and oceans. The Pacala/Socolow conceptualization has been extraordi­narily useful in helping to think about how to cut carbon emis­sions. During the three years since the article was written, the urgency of acting quickly and on a much larger scale has become obvious. We also need now to go beyond the conceptu­al approach that treats all potential methods of reducing carbon emissions equally and concentrate on those that are most prom­ising. Researchers such as James Hansen, a leading climate scien­tist at NASA, believe that global warming is accelerating and may be approaching a tipping point, a point at which climate change acquires a momentum that makes it irreversible. They think we may have a decade to turn the situation around before this threshold is crossed. I agree.?3 We often hear descriptions of what we need to do in the decades ahead or by 2050 to avoid "dangerous climate change," but we are already facing this. Two thirds of the glaciers that feed the Yellow and Yangtze rivers of China will disappear by 2060 if even the current 7 percent annual rate of melting con­tinues. Glaciologists report that the Gangotri glacier, which supplies 70 percent of the ice melt that feeds the Ganges River during the dry season, could disappear entirely in a matter of decades.74 What could threaten world food security more than the melt­ing of the glaciers that feed the major rivers of Asia during the dry season, the rivers that irrigate the region's rice and wheat fields? In a region with half the world's people, this potential loss of water during the dry season could lead not just to hunger but to starvation on an unimaginable scale. Asian food security would take a second hit because its rice­-growing river deltas and floodplains would be under water. The World Bank tells us that a sea level rise of only 1 meter would inundate half of the riceland in Bangladesh. While a 1-meter rise in sea level will not happen overnight, what is worrisome is that if ice melting continues at today's rates, at some point such a rise in sea level will no longer be preventable. The melting that would cause this is not just what may happen if the earth's tem­perature rises further; this is something that is starting to hap­pen right now with the current temperature. As summer neared an end in 2007, reports from Greenland indicated that the flow of glaciers into the sea had accelerated beyond anything glaciologists had thought possible. Huge chunks of ice weighing several billion tons each were breaking off and sliding into the sea, causing minor earthquakes as they did so.!6 With melt-water lubricating the surface between the glaciers and the rocks on which they rested, ice flows were accelerating, flowing into the ocean at a pace of 2 meters an hour. This accel­erated flow, along with the earthquakes, shows the potential for the entire ice sheet to break up and collapse?? Beyond what is already happening, the world faces a risk that some of the feedback mechanisms will begin to kick in, fur­ther accelerating the warming process. Scientists who once thought that the Arctic Ocean could be free of ice during the summer by 2100 now see it occurring by 2030. Even this could turn out to be a conservative estimate.78 This is of particular concern to scientists because of the albedo effect, where the replacement of highly reflective sea ice with darker open water greatly increases heat absorbed from sunlight. This, of course, has the potential to further accelerate the melting of the Greenland ice sheet. A second feedback loop of concern is the melting of per­mafrost. This would release billions of tons of carbon, some as methane, a potent greenhouse gas with a global warming effect per ton 25 times that of carbon dioxide.79 The risk facing humanity is that climate change could spiral out of control and it will no longer be possible to arrest trends such as ice melting and rising sea level. At this point, the future of civilization would be at risk. This combination of melting glaciers, rising seas, and their effects on food security and low-lying coastal cities could over­whelm the capacity of governments to cope. Today it is largely weak states that begin to deteriorate under the pressures of mounting environmental stresses. But the changes just described could overwhelm even the strongest of states. Civilization itself could begin to unravel under these extreme stresses.

## 2ac say yes

**Maduro will say yes to the plan**

**1). FDI—he needs it to revitalize the Venezuelan economy, it’s a lifeline to sustaining the regional economy—prefer specific evidence about the plan over generic descriptions of current Venezuelan relations- that’s Helios**

**2). sovereignty—BITs empower host states, which address a key component of Maduro’s concern**

**EBRV 13**—Embassy of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (4/26, “Venezuela Wants Respect for its Sovereignty to Improve Relations with US”, <http://venezuela-us.org/2013/04/26/venezuela-wants-respect-for-its-sovereignty-to-improve-relations-with-us/>) EL

An indispensable condition to improve relations between Venezuela and the US government is respect for national sovereignty, the new charge d’affaires of the Venezuelan Embassy in Washington, Calixto Ortega, said Thursday, reiterating the countries will for smoother bilateral dialogue. “We know that it will not be a bed of roses, but we also have the push of goodwill from many sectors in the US and the best possible will manifested by the Venezuelan government begin to open those channels, with respect, especially on the issue of sovereignty,” he said. In an interview with the TV channel Venevisión, Ortega recalled that Venezuela – US relations have historically been marked by commercial exchange. “We have been an important supplier of oil, Venezuela has refineries there, we serve more than 8,000 gas stations in the US and they supply us in various areas such as information technology,” he said. Meanwhile, the new embassy chief reasserted the international policy sustained by the government of President Hugo Chávez regarding the promotion of a multi polar world, saying this means “we open the doors to relations with many other countries as well with total and absolute sovereignty.”

**3). economic time bomb—inevitability of economic collapse forces Maduro to be pragmatic**

**Shifter 13**— President at Inter-American Dialogue (“The Empire Makes Nice Is it time for a Venezuela reset?”, 3/11, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/03/11/the\_empire\_makes\_nice\_venezuela\_hugo\_chavez?page=0,2) EL

Maduro not only expelled two military attaches from the U.S. Embassy but also intimated that Washington might have been responsible in some way for Chávez's death. Absent a shred of evidence, Maduro's words were outrageous, but aimed at proving to the base that he was a worthy heir to Chávez before the election. But it's far too early for the United States to give up hope on Maduro. Despite his reckless words in recent days, his ideologically hard-line views, and close relationship with Cuban leaders, Maduro's style contrasts sharply with Chávez's. Chávez was a military man, a former paratrooper who attempted a coup in 1992. Maduro was not only foreign minister and head of the National Assembly, but earlier in his career was a union official who negotiated deals.

\* He will be tough rhetorically, but some give-and-take behind the scenes seems feasible -- a balancing act Washington will have to understand and deal with. Maduro will likely also confront more dire economic circumstances than Chávez ever did. Politically, he will not be able to afford to reject communication and some accommodation with the private sector. In fact, Maduro has been instrumental in the Venezuelan government's constructive role in current peace talks in Havana between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). His support to what is arguably Washington's closest South American ally in an effort to bring to an end the only remaining armed conflict in the hemisphere can be construed as an example of his pragmatism.

**Maduro will be more accommodating to foreign investment—seen as political oxygen**

**Shifter 13**— President at Inter-American Dialogue (“The Empire Makes Nice Is it time for a Venezuela reset?”, 3/11, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/03/11/the\_empire\_makes\_nice\_venezuela\_hugo\_chavez?page=0,2) EL

Though uncertainty abounds in the country that Chávez so thoroughly dominated for so long, the most likely scenario is that acting President Nicolás Maduro, Chávez's designated successor, will win the election scheduled for April 14. He will benefit from an emotional boost from Chavez's death and a demoralized opposition that that was thrown off balance by major defeats in presidential and gubernatorial elections in late 2012. Maduro will preside over a government made up of diverse factions that, absent Chávez's charisma and political shrewdness, will have a hard time staying together -- particularly as the country's already serious economic conditions worsen. The Obama administration should take two critical facts about Venezuela's post-Chávez political reality into account. First, since Maduro is not Chávez, he will have little choice but to govern in a different fashion than his predecessor. Lacking comparable magnetism and resources, Maduro will likely be somewhat more accommodating to those Chávez treated with utter intransigence, such as the private sector, foreign investors, and the opposition. Maduro, acting out of self-interest, will need, and look for, political oxygen. The second is simply the risk of turbulence in Venezuela, especially after the upcoming electoral cycle. To be sure, analysts' occasional predictions about political violence during the Chávez years were (happily) not borne out. And given the extent of rancor and polarization in the society, it is striking how little political violence there has been (common crime, on the other hand, has skyrocketed). Still, the security situation is far from settled -- a militia force of 125,000 answered directly to Chávez -- and it would be a mistake to rule out chaotic and perilous scenarios that should be of great concern to the entire hemisphere. What does this mean for Washington? Assuming that Maduro succeeds Chávez, the Obama administration should be amenable to taking steps toward establishing a better relationship with Caracas. Since the relationship today is practically nonexistent, that would not require a big leap.

**Pressure to increase investment is high now—power outages and economic problems**

**BBC 9/6**—“Venezuela’s economic woes: Sabotage or mismanagement?”, Irene Caselli, <http://www.americas-forum.com/venezuelas-economic-woes-sabotage-or-mismanagement/>) EL

Theories abound in Venezuela regarding Tuesday’s blackout which affected more than two-thirds of the country. While President Nicolas Maduro has accused political opponents of sabotaging the power system, the opposition blames government incompetence for the largest power cut in five years. As parts of the country are still facing problems with the electricity and the political finger-pointing continues, many are asking just how vulnerable Venezuela’s infrastructure is. The capital, Caracas, is not used to the power cuts which have become quite common in other regions. On Tuesday, cash machines, traffic lights and the underground stopped working. There was traffic chaos, with some people stuck in train carriages. ‘Lack of investment’ Thousands of workers poured into the streets, with many finding it hard to make their way down from upper floors when emergency lamps turned out to be faulty. Jose Manuel Puente, an economist at the IESA School of Management, says the power cut is a sign of a wider malaise. “Unfortunately what happened on Tuesday is similar to what’s happening to the country’s entire infrastructure. Investment in certain areas has been reduced to minimum under [Hugo Chavez's Bolivarian] revolution,” he explained. “What we see now is an inexorable consequence of over a decade of unbalanced economic policies.” Most supporters of the late president and his successor Nicolas Maduro would not agree with Mr Puente’s analysis. But even Finance Minister Nelson Merentes recently acknowledged that the economic policies followed by the government had not been successful. In a television interview broadcast on the weekend, he called for reforms to tackle structural economic problems. “This is a government that has won 18 elections, that has had social achievements,” he told TV channel Televen. “But it still has to be successful on the economy.”

## engage venezuela

**Economic engagement with Venezuela is key to successful Latin American cooperation with the US—improves US image in the region and makes regional coalitions possible**

**Griffin, 13** – Harvard editorial writer (John, “Engage with Venezuela,” The Harvard Crimson, 3 April 2013, http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2013/4/3/Harvard-Venezuela-Chavez-death/)

Diplomatically, positive engagement with Venezuela would be a major step toward building American credibility in the world at large, especially in Latin America. Chávez (along with his friends the Castros in Cuba) was able to bolster regional support for his regime by pointing out the United States’ attempts to forcibly intervene in Venezuelan politics. Soon, a number of populist governments in Latin America had rallied around Chávez and his anti-American policies. In 2004, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and three Caribbean nations joined with Venezuela and Cuba to form the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our America, an organization in direct opposition to the Free Trade Area in the Americas proposed (but never realized) by the Bush administration. Chávez galvanized these nations—many of whom have experienced American interventionist tactics—by vilifying America as a common, imperial enemy. Unfortunately for the United States, its general strategy regarding Venezuela has often strengthened Chávez’s position. Every time Washington chastises Venezuela for opposing American interests or attempts to bring sanctions against the Latin American country, the leader in Caracas (whether it be Chávez or Maduro) simply gains more evidence toward his claim that Washington is a neo-colonialist meddler. This weakens the United States’ diplomatic position, while simultaneously strengthening Venezuela’s. If Washington wants Latin America to stop its current trend of electing leftist, Chavista governments, its first step should be to adopt a less astringent tone in dealing with Venezuela. Caracas will be unable to paint Washington as an aggressor, and Washington will in turn gain a better image in Latin America. Beyond leading to more amicable, cooperative relationships with Latin American nations, engagement with Venezuela would also be economically advisable. With the world’s largest oil reserves, countless other valuable resources, and stunning natural beauty to attract scores of tourists, Venezuela has quite a bit to offer economically. Even now, America can see the possible benefits of economic engagement with Caracas by looking at one of the few extant cases of such cooperation: Each year, thousands of needy Americans are able to keep their homes heated because of the cooperation between Venezuela and a Boston-area oil company. Engagement with Venezuela would also lead to stronger economic cooperation with the entirety of Latin America. It was mostly through Venezuela’s efforts that the United States was unable to create a “Free Trade Area of the Americas,” an endeavor that would have eliminated most trade barriers among participant nations, thereby leading to more lucrative trade. In a world where the United States and Venezuela were to enjoy normalized relations, all nations involved would benefit from such agreements. For both diplomatic and economic reasons, then, positive engagement is the best course of action for the United States. As it stands, the negative relationship between the countries has created an atmosphere of animosity in the hemisphere, hindering dialogue and making economic cooperation nearly impossible. While there is much for which the Venezuelan government can rightly be criticized—authoritarian rule, abuse of human rights, lack of market-friendly policies—nothing that the United States is doing to counter those drawbacks is having any effect. The United States should stop playing “tough guy” with Venezuela, bite the bullet, and work toward stability and prosperity for the entire hemisphere. We aren’t catching any flies with our vinegar—it’s high time we started trying to catch them with honey.

## t

**Its means belonging to or associated with**

**Dictionary.com, 9** (based on Collins English Dictionary, <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/its?s=t>)

its (ɪts)

— determiner

a. of, belonging to, or associated in some way with it: its left rear wheel

 b. ( as pronoun ): each town claims its is the best

**Economic engagement is the offer of economic incentives or removing trade and investment barriers – distinct from political, military and civil society engagement**

**Haass and O’Sullivan, 2k -** \*Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution AND \*\*a Fellow with the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution (Richard and Meghan, “Terms of Engagement: Alternatives to Punitive Policies” Survival,, vol. 42, no. 2, Summer 2000, <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/articles/2000/6/summer%20haass/2000survival.pdf>

Architects of engagement strategies can choose from a wide variety of incentives. Economic engagement might offer tangible incentives such as export credits, investment insurance or promotion, access to technology, loans and economic aid.3 Other equally useful economic incentives involve the removal of penalties such as trade embargoes, investment bans or high tariffs, which have impeded economic relations between the United States and the target country. Facilitated entry into the economic global arena and the institutions that govern it rank among the most potent incentives in today’s global market. Similarly, political engagement can involve the lure of diplomatic recognition, access to regional or international institutions, the scheduling of summits between leaders – or the termination of these benefits. Military engagement could involve the extension of international military educational training in order both to strengthen respect for civilian authority and human rights among a country’s armed forces and, more feasibly, to establish relationships between Americans and young foreign military officers. While these areas of engagement are likely to involve working with state institutions, cultural or civil-society engagement entails building people-to-people contacts. Funding nongovernmental organisations, facilitating the flow of remittances and promoting the exchange of students, tourists and other non-governmental people between countries are just some of the possible incentives used in the form of engagement.

## india cp

**venezuela key**

**Venezuela is key—reacted against investment with highest intensity**

**Gomez 10**—a Professor of Law at the University of Zaragoza (Katia Fach, July, “Latin America and ICSID: David versus Goliath?”) EL

As it has been pointed out throughout this paper, Latin America224 is currently going back to approaches that belong to the Calvo doctrine.225 This stance is considered to be beneficial by these countries, as the Calvo doctrine fosters the region’s independence from the United States and strengthens Latin American sovereignty and regionalism. Nevertheless, it must be taken into account that Latin America is not a harmonious bloc.226 This is demonstrated through a number of factors, including its level of development, its political allies and its economic policies.227 While some countries of Latin America continue to develop liberal economic policies (Chile, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, and Colombia), others (Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador) have shown their reluctance to conform to this model, and are adopting a different model of economic regulation.228 The first set of neo-liberal proposals is based on free market access, institutional efficiency, and investor protection, while, on the other hand, the anti-Free Trade Agreement countries rely on a strong state, capable of creating wealth through its control over natural resources and the economy.229 A clear example of the important differences that exist within this region are the many recent clashes between Hugo Chavez and Alvaro Uribe, president of Venezuela and former president of Colombia, respectively.230 Both leaders represent the various tendencies that coexist, and sometimes collide, within Latin America. Similar conclusions can be drawn if we analyze the specific sector of investment arbitration in Latin America. On the one hand, this paper has shown that in recent years there have been many conflicts in this field. Due to a wide number of cited reasons, the system established by ICSID has been considered detrimental by the countries of Latin America. On the other hand, despite this general anti-ICSID sentiment in Latin America, each nation is developing its own position according to its socio-political characteristics. The countries examined most thoroughly in this paper are: Argentina, Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia. Argentina’s resistance to ICSID is a result of a series of ICSID awards issued against the 43country as a consequence of an economic crisis that Argentina has considered to be a state of necessity.231 On the other hand, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia have leftist regimes, which can be considered politically volatile232 by powers like the United States.233 The control of valuable natural resources has become a national issue in these countries.234 From their perspective, the exploitation of these resources by foreign companies shows the abuse committed by the first world in Latin America. As a part of their “retaliation campaign”, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia are developing a series of initiatives aimed at eliminating ICSID as a forum for resolving international investment disputes.235 This paper has analyzed in detail these initiatives and their legal implications including the following: (1) resorting to the Constitution to ignore ICSID awards, (2) promoting national courts’ reactions against ICSID, (3) drafting international contracts that avoid ICSID arbitration, (4) withdrawing from the ICSID Convention, (5) using Bilateral Investment Treaties to combat ICSID, (6) creating national agencies to react against ICSID arbitrations, and (7) developing a regional arbitration center aimed at replacing ICSID. Within this more reactionary bloc, there are also differences in the intensity of the nations’ responses and there is some precedent for international investment disputes between South American countries that, theoretically, share approaches.236 At this time, the most radical position is that taken by Venezuela .237 In recent months, President Chavez expropriated several foreign companies operating in key sectors of the country,238 “and created a joint venture with Russia to drill for heavy crude oil in Venezuela’s Orinoco River Basin.”239 Chavez also announced his intention to withdraw Venezuela from the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights after this organization accused him of endangering democracy in Venezuela.240 This kind of news certainly worries the international community and investors, particularly those in the United States and Europe.

**Venezuela exited the ICSID in hopes of creating its own regional alternatives**

**De Cordoba 11**—reporter for Wall Street Journal (“Chávez Takes Steps to Exit Global Forum”, 9/13, Jose, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111903285704576560760106674594.html>) EL

President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela has taken steps to pull out of the global forum most used to settle investor disputes, where Caracas faces more than $40 billion in claims for nationalized properties. Enlarge Image VENEZUALA Reuters Documents show that Mr. Chávez, shown in August, is moving to avoid financial sanctions from abroad. Venezuelan officials have drawn up plans, at Mr. Chávez's order, to withdraw from the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, or ICSID, a unit of the World Bank in Washington, according to recent documents reviewed by The Wall Street Journal. A withdrawal would be the latest in a series of actions Mr. Chávez has taken to protect Venezuela's international assets from possible seizure by foreign governments and now, perhaps, creditors. Last month, Caracas announced it would transfer $6 billion in cash reserves held in European and U.S. banks to Russian, Chinese and Brazilian banks. Mr. Chávez also said he would move some 211 tons of gold valued at $11 billion held in foreign banks to Venezuela's Central Bank vault in Caracas. Venezuelan government documents say the main reason for those actions was to avoid financial sanctions by the international community, such as those that have frozen billions of dollars of Libyan government funds under Moammar Gadhafi's Libyan regime. Enlarge Image VENEZUELA Analysts peg Mr. Chávez's fears to the possibility Venezuela could have to pay billions of dollars in compensation from companies that have had assets expropriated, or that future unrest in Venezuela could lead to international sanctions. Venezuela's withdrawal from the ICSID also would fit well the nationalistic bent that has led Mr. Chávez to expropriate 988 companies, 401 so far this year, according to Conindustria, a Venezuela industry chamber. "It's pure demagogy," said Roberto Dañino, a former head of the ICSID. "Venezuela would like investors to submit themselves to national tribunals where there are no guarantees or due process." The Venezuelan Embassy in Washington declined to comment. Lawyers at Arnold & Porter LLP and Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mosle LLP, the two principal firms that Venezuela uses to defend itself from claimants at the ICSID, declined to comment. A Venezuelan foreign ministry official said the country wasn't considering withdrawing from ICSID now, though he acknowledged meetings on the subject had been held. Another Venezuelan official countered that the move was, in fact, now being debated by high-ranking officials. Lawyers familiar with ICSID procedures say a Venezuelan withdrawal wouldn't have any impact on the 18 claims that Venezuela now faces at the World Bank unit. For starters, it would only take effect six months after notice is given to the center, said Dietmar W. Prager, a lawyer with the New York firm of Debevoise & Plimpton LLP who has represented investors with ICSID disputes with Venezuela. Further, bilateral investment treaties bind Venezuela to ICSID arbitration for a period, depending on the treaty, from between 10 to 15 years after the cancellation of an agreement, according to lawyers and Venezuela's own documents. "The Venezuelans can't say I'm taking my marbles and going home," said Michael Nolan, a lawyer at the Washington office of Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy LLP, who has represented clients with Venezuelan claims at the ICSID. Eventually, the government papers say, Venezuela's goal is to replace ICSID with a dispute-settlement mechanism that would fit within the framework of Latin American integration groups such as the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas or the Union of South American Nations, which were either founded by or heavily influenced by Caracas. "It may be a combination to play to the balcony and make Chávez appear as a regional leader leading an attempt to gut the international investment protection system," said James Lloyd Loftis, who heads law firm Vinson & Elkins's international dispute resolution practice. A withdrawal would send an unfriendly signal about Venezuela's policy towards foreign investment, Mr. Prager said. To be sure, foreign investors have already gotten the message, as foreign companies have been taking more assets out of the country than they have been putting in it. Foreign direct investment was a negative $3.1 billion in 2009 and a negative $1.4 billion in 2010, according to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. At ICSID, companies lining up to seek compensation from Venezuela range from oil giants to gold mining companies, and include some of the world's largest cement manufacturers. ConocoPhillips by far has the largest claim. The oil company wants to recover $30 billion in compensation for stakes in two projects in the Orinoco heavy oil fields, according to Reuters. Another oil giant, Exxon Mobil Corp., has cut its claim for compensation to $7 billion for Mr. Chávez's 2007 seizure of a heavy crude project from an initial $12 billion, Venezuela said last year. An Exxon spokesman declined to comment. Mexican cement maker Cemex and Swiss cement maker Holcim are seeking compensation for Mr. Chávez' seizure of their plants in 2008 as part of the Venezuelan government nationalization of the country's cement industry. Holcim recently reached a $650 million settlement with Venezuela. The Swiss company has temporarily suspended its legal action depending on whether Venezuela complies with the terms of the settlement, said a person knowledgeable about the case. Cemex's action is ongoing. This year, Crystallex, a Canadian gold miner, filed an action seeking $3.8 billion in compensation for the government's unilateral termination of a giant gold mining project. A spokesman for Crystallex said the company's legal action wouldn't be affected if Venezuela were to withdraw from ICSID. Since 2007, Mr. Chávez has publicly contemplated a pullout from the ICSID. Some of his closest allies have already left. Bolivia pulled out in 2007 and Ecuador followed suit in 2009. Lawyers familiar with arbitration disputes say their withdrawal from ICSID pullout has not had any noticeable impact on claims against the two countries. Venezuelan documents show that withdrawing from the ICSID would only start a complex and difficult process. Caracas would have to renegotiate bilateral investment protection treaties with 23 nations, including European countries to allies including Iran and Russia.

## ptx- rr

**Won’t pass – base opposition and no moderates**

**Gandelman, 9/18**/13 – (Joe, “Republicans all in: government shutdown by Repubicans virtually certain” <http://themoderatevoice.com/186749/republicans-all-in-government-shutdown-by-repubicans-virtually-certain/>)

It’s going to happen. You can bet on it. Republicans now seem all in – despite some pesky noises from they-must-be-RINO websites such as the Wall Street Journal and the National Review about the dangers — to set the stage for a government shut down. And don’t be surprised if it then gets worse and House Republicans engineer a default on the debt ceiling as well:

House Republicans are moving forward with a government funding bill that would defund ObamaCare.

The legislation is a nod to House conservatives, some of whom quickly backed the plan.

But Senate Democrats and the White House have promised to reject any legislation that would defund the healthcare law, meaning the legislation won’t move farther than the House.

Unless the House and Senate can agree on legislation and get it to the White House by Oct. 1, the government will shut down at that time.

Basically, the GOP House leadership is politically twerking its powerful Tea Party sympathetic members. But the consquences to many Americans that even a brief shutdown would bring could be huge.

And who says this will necessarily be a brief shutdown?

The House measure would keep the government funded through Dec. 15 at the current $986 billion spending rate, rather than the lower $967 billion level called for in the 2011 Budget Control Act.

GOP leaders also announced Wednesday that they will condition a debt ceiling increase on a one-year delay of ObamaCare, approval of the Keystone XL pipeline and an outline for tax reform.

In other words:

Republicans are going to use political extortion — hurting the United States’s economy — if they can’t get policies that they are unable to get by winning elections or putting together coalitions in Congress. It’s a tough choice for Barack Obama and the Democrats: if this is allowed to happen it will fundamentally change the form of American democracy.

Republican Study Committee Chairman Steve Scalise (R-La.) said he was on board with the plan despite the higher spending level.

“This reflects the principles we’ve been pushing for,” he said. “We want to address ObamaCare directly in the CR. We want to address ObamaCare in the debt ceiling and this keeps both of those moving.”

Yes — in a way unprecedented in American democracy. And:

Rep. Tom Graves (R-Ga.), who authored a one-year CR that would increase defense spending while defunding ObamaCare, said he would vote for the new Boehner plan.

“It’s a step in the right direction,” Graves said. “The American people should view this as a victory.”

I agree with Booman: there is a notable lack of adults in the Republican room, and a notably large number of conservative talk show host followers and Tea Party members. Booman:

It’s a two-pronged approach. On the continuing resolution (CR) to fund the government, the Republicans will limit the funding to December 15th. The funding level will be slightly above what the Budget Control Act of 2011 calls for. And it will defund ObamaCare.

On the debt ceiling, they will have a separate vote that will delay ObamaCare for a year, authorize the Keystone XL pipeline, and provide an outline for tax reform.

Their hope is that they can successfully pass the buck to Republican senators who will be expected to sustain a filibuster against any CR or debt ceiling hike that includes money for health care.

It really doesn’t matter whether the Senate Republicans go along with the plan or not, because the government will shut down either way and we will default on our debts either way.

The pressure on Republican senators will be intense, but they’d rather let the House take the blame for the catastrophe.

The fact that the Senate Minority Leader, Mitch McConnell, is facing a primary challenge from his right makes it unlikely that he will ride to the House’s rescue this time around. If we’re hoping for adult leadership in the Senate, it will have to come from a rump of moderate Republican senators that doesn’t seem to exist.

**Engagement with Venezuela popular in Congress – Chavez’s death changed the equation.**

**Spetalnick ‘13**

Matt Spetalnick – White House correspondent who has covered news on four continents for Reuters, from Latin American coups and drug wars – Reuter’s – March 6th, 2013 – “Despite new hopes, U.S. treads cautiously after death of Venezuela's Chavez” – http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/03/06/uk-venezuela-chavez-usa-idUKBRE92504920130306

Washington's challenge will be to figure out how far to go in seizing the opening to engage with Venezuelan leaders as well as its political opposition without giving the impression of U.S. meddling following the socialist president's death after a two-year battle with cancer. "We're not interested in having a confrontational relationship with Venezuela," a senior U.S. official told Reuters. "We're going to have to see how things evolve. It's a dynamic period." For Washington, a major test will be whether Venezuela follows its own constitution - which has been widely interpreted to require a special election to pick Chavez's successor - and if such a vote is conducted in a free and fair way in "accordance with hemispheric norms," the official said. Washington had accused Chavez and his allies of electoral abuses, such as intimidating foes and misusing state media during his 14-year rule. Chavez had created headaches for successive U.S. administrations with his strong anti-American rhetoric and his alliances with some of Washington's main foes, including Cuba and Iran. The question now is whether his leftist "revolution" and incendiary foreign policy can live on without his dominant personality at the helm. In a normally divided Washington, Chavez's death brought a rare moment of bipartisan agreement, with Republicans and Democrats alike seeing it as a chance to turn a page after a long period of strained U.S.-Venezuelan ties.

**Prefer qualified evidence – PC doesn’t influence Congress**

**Dickinson 9** professor of political science at Middlebury College (Matthew, “Sotomayor, Obama and Presidential Power,” May 26, 2009 Presidential Power <http://blogs.middlebury.edu/presidentialpower/2009/05/26/sotamayor-obama-and-presidential-power/>]

What is of more interest to me, however, is what her selection reveals about the basis of presidential power. Political scientists, like baseball writers evaluating hitters, have devised numerous means of measuring a president’s influence in Congress. I will devote a separate post to discussing these, but in brief, they often center on the creation of legislative “box scores” designed to measure how many times a president’s preferred piece of legislation, or nominee to the executive branch or the courts, is approved by Congress. That is, how many pieces of legislation that the president supports actually pass Congress? How often do members of Congress vote with the president’s preferences? How often is a president’s policy position supported by roll call outcomes? These measures, however, are a misleading gauge of presidential power – they are a better indicator of congressional power. This is because how members of Congress vote on a nominee or legislative item is rarely influenced by anything a president does. Although journalists (and political scientists) often focus on the legislative “endgame” to gauge presidential influence – will the President swing enough votes to get his preferred legislation enacted? – this mistakes an outcome with actual evidence of presidential influence. Once we control for other factors – a member of Congress’ ideological and partisan leanings, the political leanings of her constituency, whether she’s up for reelection or not – we can usually predict how she will vote without needing to know much of anything about what the president wants. (I am ignoring the importance of a president’s veto power for the moment.) Despite the much publicized and celebrated instances of presidential arm-twisting during the legislative endgame, then, most legislative outcomes don’t depend on presidential lobbying. But this is not to say that presidents lack influence. Instead, the primary means by which presidents influence what Congress does is through their ability to determine the alternatives from which Congress must choose. That is, presidential power is largely an exercise in agenda-setting – not arm-twisting. And we see this in the Sotomayer nomination. Barring a major scandal, she will almost certainly be confirmed to the Supreme Court whether Obama spends the confirmation hearings calling every Senator or instead spends the next few weeks ignoring the Senate debate in order to play Halo III on his Xbox. That is, how senators decide to vote on Sotomayor will have almost nothing to do with Obama’s lobbying from here on in (or lack thereof). His real influence has already occurred, in the decision to present Sotomayor as his nominee. If we want to measure Obama’s “power”, then, we need to know what his real preference was and why he chose Sotomayor. My guess – and it is only a guess – is that after conferring with leading Democrats and Republicans, he recognized the overriding practical political advantages accruing from choosing an Hispanic woman, with left-leaning credentials. We cannot know if this would have been his ideal choice based on judicial philosophy alone, but presidents are never free to act on their ideal preferences. Politics is the art of the possible. Whether Sotomayer is his first choice or not, however, her nomination is a reminder that the power of the presidency often resides in the president’s ability to dictate the alternatives from which Congress (or in this case the Senate) must choose. Although Republicans will undoubtedly attack Sotomayor for her judicial “activism” (citing in particular her decisions regarding promotion and affirmative action), her comments regarding the importance of gender and ethnicity in influencing her decisions, and her views regarding whether appellate courts “make” policy, they run the risk of alienating Hispanic voters – an increasingly influential voting bloc (to the extent that one can view Hispanics as a voting bloc!) I find it very hard to believe she will not be easily confirmed. In structuring the alternative before the Senate in this manner, then, Obama reveals an important aspect of presidential power that cannot be measured through legislative boxscores.

**no link—the plan has nothing to do with the oil industry**

**PC isn’t key to the debt ceiling**

**Klein, 9/18/**13 - columnist at the Washington Post, as well as a contributor to MSNBC. His work focuses on domestic and economic policymaking,(Ezra, Washington Post, “The White House doesn’t think it can prevent a government shutdown” <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/09/18/the-white-house-doesnt-think-it-can-prevent-a-government-shutdown/>)

And there is a difference between 2011 and 2013. Two of them, in fact.

1) In 2011, the White House knew whom to deal with. Back then, House Speaker John Boehner actually did seem reasonably in sync with his party on these issues, and so the White House was able to negotiate with Republican leadership on a deal. Today, the relevant negotiations are happening in the Republican Party, with GOP leadership trying to fight conservatives who want to shut down the government, and no one knows who actually has the power to cut and close a deal.

2) In 2011, the White House was willing to deal. The White House believed, in its gut, that Republicans had been given a mandate in the 2010 elections to extract exactly the kind of concessions they were demanding. In addition, the White House believed President Obama would be a likelier bet for reelection if he could cut a "grand bargain" with the newly resurgent Republicans, taking their key issue away from them.

This year, it's the White House that won the last election, and so they see no popular legitimacy behind Republican demands. In addition, they are deeply, fervently committed to the proposition that they will never again negotiate around the debt ceiling, as that's a tactic history will judge them harshly for repeatedly enabling. So even if Boehner could cut a deal on the debt ceiling, the White House isn't open to negotiating.

All of which helps explain the White House's more alarmist communications strategy. In 2011, the White House was confident they could cut a deal with Republicans and, in some ways, eager to do so. That gave them a sense of control over the situation.

This year, they're not willing to cut a deal with the Republicans on the debt ceiling, and they're not sure the Republicans can cut a deal with themselves on funding the government, all of which means the White House doesn't have much control over this situation. That's why they're trying to worry business and Wall Street and other outside actors who could put pressure on the GOP.

**Winners win—Bush proves**

**Fortier 9** [John, Research Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, January 14th, Spend Your Political Capital Before It's Gone, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0109/17395.html]

Bush came into the presidency after a protracted election dispute but acted like a man with a mandate. His election victory, no matter how small, was a form of political capital to be spent, and he pushed his tax and education reform packages through Congress. After the Sept. 11 attacks, Republican victories in the 2002 midterm election and the initial phase of the Iraq war, Bush gained more political capital. And each time, he spent it, going to Congress for more tax cuts, the creation of a Department of Homeland Security and other domestic priorities. Bush developed the image of a winner. Despite narrow Republican majorities in Congress, he succeeded in holding his party together and pulling out one legislative victory after another. He famously did not veto a bill in his first term. Even when Bush veered from a typical conservative agenda on education reform and Medicare prescription drugs, Republicans voted with him, although some held their noses. Republicans in Congress did not want to break the string of Bush’s first-term legislative juggernaut. Bush was spending his political capital and, by winning, was getting repaid. Bush’s 2004 reelection was the apex of his presidency. He won a spirited, high- turnout contest by a clear margin, he brought more Republicans to Congress, and he was ready to spend his latest cache of political capital on two big domestic priorities: Social Security reform and tax reform. But 2005 saw Bush lose all of his political capital. His domestic priorities were bold, but he had overreached and did not have plans that Congress could get to work on immediately. The legislative vacuum in Congress stood in contrast to Bush’s first term, where Congress was almost always busy at work on Bush priorities. More importantly, conditions in Iraq deteriorated, and the public began to lose confidence in the president and his ability to win the war. Bush himself said that he had spent his political capital in Iraq and had lost it there. Republican scandals and the president’s lack of leadership immediately after Hurricane Katrina further damaged Bush. The winning streak was over, the president’s job approval numbers had dropped and his days setting the legislative agenda were over. Even though Bush had his biggest Republican majorities in the 109th Congress, Republican leaders staked out their own agenda, not wanting to tie themselves to a now unpopular president. Bush never regained political capital after 2005. Ronald Reagan had early heady days when he controlled the agenda; his popularity waned, but he was able to regain his footing. Bill Clinton famously bounced from highs to lows and back again. But for Bush, there was no second act. Reagan and Clinton could counterpunch and thrive as president without control of Congress. The Bush presidency had only two settings: on and off. In his first term, Bush controlled the legislative agenda like a prime minister; in the second, others set the agenda. President-elect Barack Obama won election more convincingly than Bush, and he will have larger congressional majorities than Republicans had. No doubt he will begin with some political capital of his own. But as the Bush presidency has taught us, that capital will run out someday, and a real test of leadership will be how Obama adjusts.

**Plan’s popular and Obama doesn’t need to push—Rwanda BIT proves**

**Broadbent and Pancake 12**—Meredith Broadbent is a senior adviser at CSIS, where she holds the William M. Scholl Chair in International Business and Robbins Pancake a senior associate for the William M. Scholl Chair in International Business (“Reinvigorating the U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaty Program”, June, <http://csis.org/files/publication/120629_Broadbent_ReinvigoratingBIT_Web.pdf>) EL

What are the key constituencies?¶ Two constituencies in Washington tend to oppose BITs—significant portions of the development¶ community and some Democratic members of Congress close to labor and environmental interest¶ groups. The concerns of both constituencies need to be addressed in order for a robust BIT¶ program to go forward.¶ Traditionally, the development community has taken the view that economic development is¶ best promoted by foreign aid that, if targeted correctly, should be sustainable and eventually spur¶ local private-sector growth. Included in that view may also be skepticism about whether private¶ multinational business investors will actually integrate into the local economy and help develop¶ the institutional infrastructure and good governance necessary for long-term growth and employment.¶ The truth may be somewhere in the middle, but additional outreach to the development¶ community, advocacy organizations, and the African Development Bank would be useful.¶ A message in support of BITs needs to be crafted to confirm that in the twenty-first century¶ global economy, private-sector trade and investment are economic development tools that create¶ jobs and commerce in developing countries, thereby improving living standards.36 In addition, it is¶ important to demonstrate that BITs and other regional and multilateral agreements are vehicles for¶ increasing transparency and rule of law, not part of a hidden agenda of multinational companies¶ to exploit the developing world. For instance, the huge increase (cited above) in FDI as a percentage¶ of total investment, compared to foreign aid, demonstrates that dramatic changes have taken¶ place over the last 50 years. Further, of the 2,600 BITs concluded in the last 50 years, more than¶ 1,200 are South-South BITs between developing countries, which tend to disprove the allegation¶ of a North-South plot by the United States and multinational companies. In addition, the World¶ Bank and in particular its outgoing president Robert Zoellick are strong advocates of trade and¶ investment as development tools preferable to aid.¶ Congress, for its part, plays a direct role in developing and implementing national policy on¶ investment because the Senate, led by the Foreign Relations Committee, has the constitutional¶ responsibility to ratify treaties, including BITs. In addition, since foreign trade agreements—which¶ include chapters on investment—are subject to approvals by both houses, all members are involved¶ to some extent.¶ Therefore, part of a BIT program should include framing a message to Congress in support of¶ BITs and addressing the issues of interest to members. For instance, the studies referenced above,¶ which show that establishing BITs is a job creator in the United States, would be very useful. Likewise,¶ characterizing a reenergized U.S. BIT program as a counterweight to Chinese commercial¶ outreach to the developing world would appeal to many members.37 Certain members of Congress,¶ including Democrats like Congressmen Greg Meeks (D-NY) and Joe Crowley (D-NY) and¶ Senators Mark Warner (D-VA) and possibly Robert Menendez (D-NJ), could serve as champions¶ for the FDI and BITs with their colleagues. Indeed, given the arcane nature of BITs, finding a few¶ willing advocates to champion the merits of BITs is probably the way to proceed.¶ Ultimately, despite all the concerns and criticisms, on September 28, 2011, the Senate did¶ ratify the pending U.S.-Rwanda BIT by unanimous voice vote. So, the partisanship in the current¶ Congress apparently did not prove insurmountable in passing a BIT, as some had previously¶ thought.

**The budget fight comes before the debt ceiling and costs capital**

**Koring, 9/16**/13 (Paul, The Globe and Mail (Canada), “Obama faces fall clash with Congress;

Despite averting military action in Syria, U.S. President fights plunging approval ratings and feuding Republicans on Capitol Hill” lexis)

With war against Syria averted, or perhaps postponed, U.S. President Barack Obama can turn again to September's anticipated battles against his still-implacable Republican opponents.

Looming is a Sept. 30 deadline for Congress to fund ongoing government operations - everything from food stamps to new bullets - and a showdown is shaping up between a weakened President and Republicans riven by their own divisions.

Then, some time in October, the U.S. Treasury will face another crisis as it reaches its borrowing limit. Without an increase, which some Republicans want to block, the U.S. government could face default. Meanwhile, hopes for progress on major policy initiatives such as immigration reform, long expected to be the big legislative issue this fall, are fading.

As hostile as relations are, some observers suggest the averted showdown over Syria - it's now widely accepted that Congress would have rejected Mr. Obama's call for an authorization of force had it gone to a vote - didn't make things any worse.

"We don't know what September would have looked like in the absence of the Syria issue, but my guess is that it would have looked an awful lot like it looks today," said Sarah Binder, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, which watches Congress closely.

"These divisions over spending and size of government have been with us all along, and the [Republican] opposition to Obama has been quite strong all along. ... Set aside the issue of Syria, and really nothing has changed."

**No default impact – it’s political hype**

**Boccia, 9/18**/13 – fellow in federal budgetary affairs at the Heritage Foundation (Romina, “Debt Limit: Options and the Way Forward” <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/09/debt-limit-options-and-the-way-forward>)

If Congress does not raise the debt limit by mid-October, the Treasury would not necessarily default on debt obligations. Even while cash-strapped, the Treasury can reasonably be expected to prioritize principal and interest payments on the national debt, protecting the full faith and credit of the United States above all other spending. It is almost impossible to conceive that the Treasury and the President would choose to default on debt obligations because doing so would have damaging economic consequences.

Nevertheless, the Treasury and the President have repeatedly invoked the threat of default to pressure Congress into raising the debt ceiling without substantial spending cuts and policy reforms. In July, Secretary Lew said on ABC’s This Week: “Congress can’t let us default. Congress has to do its work.”[6] On August 26, he wrote to Congress: “Congress should act as soon as possible to protect America’s good credit by extending normal borrowing authority well before any risk of default becomes imminent.”[7] President Obama also mentioned default at the G-20 summit: “That includes making sure we don’t risk a U.S. default over paying bills we’ve already racked up.”[8 ]

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**No Russian influence since death of Chavez**

**Tarasanko and Savranov ’13** (3/11/13, Pavel and Ivan, Worldcrunch, “WILL RUSSIA'S COZY RELATIONSHIP WITH VENEZUELA DIE WITH CHAVEZ?, http://www.worldcrunch.com/world-affairs/will-russia-039-s-cozy-relationship-with-venezuela-die-with-chavez-/venezuela-chavez-russia-oil-military-trade-weapons/c1s11149/”)

Now Venezuela is preparing to elect a new president. No matter who wins, whether it is Chavez’s designated successor or the opposition candidate, experts say that there will likely be serious changes. “No new government is going to continue the sharp anti-Americanism that Chavez governed with," explained Fedor Lukyanov, a representative of the Russian Council on Foreign Relations. "If Maduro wins, the relationship between Caracas and Washington will improve. If the opposition wins, then the country will totally reorient itself towards the United States.” The Kremlin has expressed hope that “the positive and constructive Russian-Venezuelan relations will remain unchanged.” But Lukyanov is convinced to the contrary: “The 2000s were an anomaly, when Venezuela became one of Russia’s most important world trade partners, and that anomaly is unlikely to survive Chavez’s death, because it was connected to Chavez personally, to his personal political views and ambitions.” Another experts says: “many of the agreements between Caracas and Moscow will remain, at least on paper, but others will likely be revisited.” False friendships, mythical deals Vladimir Semago, the vice-head of the Russian-Venezuelan Commerce Council is even more emphatic. “Now that Hugo Chavez is gone, all of this pretense of friendship with Venezuela will go, too,” he told Kommersant. “There was never any real partnership between our countries, there were only attempts to convince Russians that Moscow was colonizing Latin America, like it did in Africa during Soviet times.” According to Semago, one of the most ambitious projects – the creation of an oil consortium that is a partnership between the Russian national companies and the Venezuelan oil company – is a “total myth.” “The consortium was never allowed to do anything and never accomplished anything. There were only ever two Russian companies that were interested, anyway,” Semago explained.

Not zero sum—Russia isn’t competitive

Sudarev ‘12 – Professor of American Countries’ History and Politics (Vladimir Sudarey, Doctor of Political Science, Professor of the European and American Countries’ History and Politics Department of the MGIMO University, “" Is Russia returning to Latin America?"” February 20, 2012, http://russiancouncil.ru/en/inner/?id\_4=252#top)

It can be largely attributed to the fact that Russian leadership has no priority system in interacting with this country. The latter, from our perspective, is explained by poor understanding of how much inter-complimentary could be the interests of the two resource-rich countries in the decades to come. Unfortunately, China, and lately India have been much more economically active in the region than Russia, filling the niches in the market that could have been well filled by Russia. Another question is why Brazilian dimension of Russian foreign policy is much weaker than the Chinese one? Why do we transfer to China, the relationships with which in the 20th century were abundant with conflicts including the armed ones, unique military aircraft building technologies, while denying this to Brazil with which we have never had conflicts or clashes on the international arena? Perhaps, it is the residual principle inherent of the USSR leadership and successfully inherited in 1990-s by the Russian leadership that is applied to this region. But, while the USSR used to have Cuba as a strategic partner, the Russian Federation, having curtailed the ties with the Island of Freedom, didn’t bother to start looking for new partners and paid as little attention to the relations with Brazil as with any other Latin American country. If Russia is really interested in serious and politically influential partners, then it is the Brazil dimension that should be prioritized as the major vector of Russian policy in the region. It means establishing a special system of partnership which will include an overhaul of the current system of trade and economic relations, an introduction of a new system of preferential terms of advanced know-how transfer and exchange, particularly in aerospace field. For that sake it’s necessary to maximally intensify the relations with Brazil’s leadership and take them to a higher level, with the head of state or the government taking control of it. However, the growing understanding of the Russian upper echelons of power of the necessity to shift the focus of economic cooperation with the countries of the region on to scientific and technical sphere arouses certain optimism. It is in the field of advanced technologies where Russia is most competitive, and no wonder that the main emphasis during the April 2010 visit of President Medvedev to the countries of the region was laid on this very issue. Low competitiveness of Russia vis-à-vis other countries undertaking huge efforts with a view to building up their political and economic position in this region continues to persist. Besides, our investment capability is also much lower than that of USA, China, EU and even India.

**Clash in LA now- US ramping up military response to Russia arms sales**

**Blank 2009** (Stephen Blank is Professor of Russian National Security Studies at the Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College, “Russia in Latin America: Geopolitical Games in the US's Neighborhood.” Ifri, Russia/NIS Center April, www.ifri.org/downloads/ifriblankrussiaandlatinamericaengapril09.pdf‎)

In 2008, Russia, like Columbus, discovered Latin America. Or so Western and Russian media would have us believe. Leading commentators speculated about the motives behind presidential and ministerial visits to and from Russia; major arms, trade and energy deals; visits by Russian long-range bombers, and joint naval exercises with Venezuela, and fleet calls to Nicaragua and Cuba occurred. Although the Pentagon professes no alarm, Washington sent Thomas Shannon, the Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America, to Moscow to ascertain Russia’s precise aims. Having expressed US concerns regarding the destabilizing effects of Russian arms sales to Venezuela, Shannon’s visit undoubtedly proved that Russia could get Washington’s attention.1 Moreover, for the first time in years, the Pentagon in 2008 stood up the Fourth Fleet in the South Atlantic. Its formal missions are to safeguard maritime routes, conduct disaster relief, engage in humanitarian operations, and conduct multilateral operations with Latin American navies.2 Nevertheless, observers naturally see it as a response to heightened risk perception.

**No war over Venezuela**

**Ramírez 2010** (Pablo Telman Sánchez, Phd, Specialist Professor in International Law and Political and Social Sciences, professor at Instituto Tecnológico y de Estudios Superiores de Monterrey, Mexico City campus. He is a Member of the Mexican National Research System, Level 2“Is a New Climate of Confrontation Between Russia and the United States Possible in Latin America?,” Latin American Policy Volume 1, Issue 2, pages 230–243, December 2010, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.2041-7373.2010.00017.x/abstract )

As of 2008, the Russian Federation has launched an intensive diplomatic, economic, and even cultural offensive in Latin America, but the course that this policy takes will depend on the positions undertaken by the White House in the near future. The Kremlin must consider seriously whether it wants to establish a constructive and stable relationship with the United States at the expense of moderating its relationships with the left-wing governments of Latin America. Russia includes in its current strategy for Latin America the most stable and centrist countries in the Latin American traditional left, such as Brazil and Chile (recently a center-right president took office), and the most radical, such as Ecuador, Argentina, Nicaragua, and Bolivia. Although some analysts consider that the main interests of the Kremlin are in Venezuela with attempts to create an alliance to weaken U.S. clout in the region, this is false. Ties between Latin America and Russia will be only temporary and will depend on the position that the United States takes toward Russia. The Kremlin considers that Europe and the United States have high geopolitical and economic importance for its national security. If the United States hypothetically decided to invade Venezuela, Russia would probably not take a position in any military conflict in favor of the Venezuelan government. Russia has another priority closer to its territory where it is investing more money and more diplomacy: the buffer zone. Countries such as Ukraine and Georgia represent the geopolitical priorities of the Russian Federation, and the structuring of foreign policy relies on these circumstances. In this sense, Latin America becomes a secondary priority that might occupy the position left by the Eastern European territories and the Baltic countries, although the distance that separates Russia from Latin America and the instability of Latin America’s political systems (in Chile, one of the most stable countries politically and economically, the right has taken over the presidency after two decades of leftist governments) are a warning for the Kremlin with regard to the extent of its bilateral ties with the region.

**Wont escalate – not even proxy wars**

**Ellis 2011** (R Evan, an assistant professor with the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies (CHDS). His research focus is on Latin America’s relationship with external actors, including China, Russia, and Iran. “Emerging Multi-Power Competitions in Latin America,” http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/apjinternational/apj-s/2011/2011-1/2011\_1\_03\_ellis\_eng\_s.pdf)

Although there will be various types of violence within, and perhaps between, states in Latin America, it is important to emphasize, that the focus of interaction between states of the region and external actors will be primarily securing an advantage commerce and national development, rather than in war, with competitions for the signing of trade accords, and technology sharing agreements, investment, the granting of privileged access to develop a nation’s mineral and hydrocarbon resources, or who supports whom in multilateral institutions. It is possible that external powers could become involved in a proxy war, in an attempt to hold up a regime in which they have strategic commercial interests, but such prospects remain distant at the present time.

**Wont go to war over perceived sphere of influence**

**Ottens ‘11** (Nick Ottens, editor of the transatlantic news and commentary site the Atlantic Sentinel and contributing analyst for the geostrategic consultancy Wikistrat, “The Myth of Russia’s Resurgence,” August 20 2011, http://atlanticsentinel.com/2011/08/the-myth-of-russias-resurgence/)

Wikistrat‘s Thomas Barnett reminds readers of Russian fears of encirclement in his latest World Politics Review column. After shrugging off its empire in 1991, Russia was denied a “sense of belonging,” Barnett notes, when Europe and the United States refused to consider Russia’s entry to NATO. Instead, America moved in militarily from the south as part of its global War on Terror while China progressively encroached, in an economic sense, on Russia’s “near abroad” in Central Asia and the Far East. Russia has been remarkably reluctant to counter these infringements. Although nearly all former Warsaw Pact members belong to the European Union now, it has made only halfhearted attempts to regain a semblance of hegemony on its western border. Old Eastern Bloc nations may still worry about Russian antagonism, especially if Germany, which is so dependent on Russian gas imports, won’t truly protect them in the EU (which is why they expect security from the United States in NATO)—the likelihood of Moscow deploying force against Poland, Lithuania or even the Ukraine is close to zero. In other parts of its former empire, too, Russia is far from belligerent. Although vying for influence there with nearby greater powers, Russia has refrained from policing Central Asia in Soviet style despite the alluring natural resources that the region possesses. When Kyrgyzstan asked for a Russian troop presence last year to quell political unrest, the Kremlin balked at the request. It had no desire to become entangled in the internal power struggles of its former client state. Russian cultural and political influence pervades especially in the northernmost of former socialist republics in Central Asia but Chinese, Iranian and Turkish attempts at fostering stable relations in the area could set the stage for a greater power confrontation, one from which Moscow stands nothing to gain. Russian governors in the Far East occasionally raise the specter of the “yellow menace” and talk of the danger posed to their underpopulated provinces by unregulated Chinese labor migrants but as Dmitry Gorenburg pointed out here last year, “this kind of talk rarely emanates from Moscow and certainly does not affect troop positioning.” Indeed, “it is stunning how little trouble Moscow has fomented” since the demise of the Soviet Union, writes Barnett, “all while engineering arguably the greatest military demobilization in human history, going from more than two hundred army divisions to less than one hundred brigades.”

**Even a rapid US-Russia war would end in peace negotiations before nukes were launched – Russian generals concede.**

**Ivashov ‘7** (Colonel General Leonid Ivashov, President of the Academy of Geopolitical Problems. July 2007 “WILL AMERICA FIGHT RUSSIA”. Defense and Security, No 78. LN

Ivashov: Numerous scenarios and options are possible. Everything may begin as a local conflict that will rapidly deteriorate into a total confrontation. An ultimatum will be sent to Russia: say, change the domestic policy because human rights are allegedly encroached on, or give Western businesses access to oil and gas fields. Russia will refuse and its objects (radars, air defense components, command posts, infrastructure) will be wiped out by guided missiles with conventional warheads and by aviation. Once this phase is over, an even stiffer ultimatum will be presented - demanding something up to the deployment of NATO "peacekeepers" on the territory of Russia. Refusal to bow to the demands will be met with a mass aviation and missile strike at Army and Navy assets, infrastructure, and objects of defense industry. NATO armies will invade Belarus and western Russia. Two turns of events may follow that. Moscow may accept the ultimatum through the use of some device that will help it save face. The acceptance will be followed by talks over the estrangement of the Kaliningrad enclave, parts of the Caucasus and Caspian region, international control over the Russian gas and oil complex, and NATO control over Russian nuclear forces. The second scenario involves a warning from the Kremlin to the United States that continuation of the aggression will trigger retaliation with the use of all weapons in nuclear arsenals. It will stop the war and put negotiations into motion

# aff vs st. marks

## 2ac say yes

**sovereignty—BITs empower host states, which address a key component of Maduro’s concern**

**EBRV 13**—Embassy of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (4/26, “Venezuela Wants Respect for its Sovereignty to Improve Relations with US”, <http://venezuela-us.org/2013/04/26/venezuela-wants-respect-for-its-sovereignty-to-improve-relations-with-us/>) EL

An indispensable condition to improve relations between Venezuela and the US government is respect for national sovereignty, the new charge d’affaires of the Venezuelan Embassy in Washington, Calixto Ortega, said Thursday, reiterating the countries will for smoother bilateral dialogue. “We know that it will not be a bed of roses, but we also have the push of goodwill from many sectors in the US and the best possible will manifested by the Venezuelan government begin to open those channels, with respect, especially on the issue of sovereignty,” he said. In an interview with the TV channel Venevisión, Ortega recalled that Venezuela – US relations have historically been marked by commercial exchange. “We have been an important supplier of oil, Venezuela has refineries there, we serve more than 8,000 gas stations in the US and they supply us in various areas such as information technology,” he said. Meanwhile, the new embassy chief reasserted the international policy sustained by the government of President Hugo Chávez regarding the promotion of a multi polar world, saying this means “we open the doors to relations with many other countries as well with total and absolute sovereignty.”

**3). economic time bomb—inevitability of economic collapse forces Maduro to be pragmatic**

**Shifter 13**— President at Inter-American Dialogue (“The Empire Makes Nice Is it time for a Venezuela reset?”, 3/11, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/03/11/the\_empire\_makes\_nice\_venezuela\_hugo\_chavez?page=0,2) EL

Maduro not only expelled two military attaches from the U.S. Embassy but also intimated that Washington might have been responsible in some way for Chávez's death. Absent a shred of evidence, Maduro's words were outrageous, but aimed at proving to the base that he was a worthy heir to Chávez before the election. But it's far too early for the United States to give up hope on Maduro. Despite his reckless words in recent days, his ideologically hard-line views, and close relationship with Cuban leaders, Maduro's style contrasts sharply with Chávez's. Chávez was a military man, a former paratrooper who attempted a coup in 1992. Maduro was not only foreign minister and head of the National Assembly, but earlier in his career was a union official who negotiated deals. He will be tough rhetorically, but some give-and-take behind the scenes seems feasible -- a balancing act Washington will have to understand and deal with. Maduro will likely also confront more dire economic circumstances than Chávez ever did. Politically, he will not be able to afford to reject communication and some accommodation with the private sector. In fact, Maduro has been instrumental in the Venezuelan government's constructive role in current peace talks in Havana between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). His support to what is arguably Washington's closest South American ally in an effort to bring to an end the only remaining armed conflict in the hemisphere can be construed as an example of his pragmatism.

## at: climate treaty bad

**No impact to heg.**

**Ikenberry 08** – professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University (John, “The Rise of China and the Future of the West Can the Liberal System Survive?” Jan/Feb 2008, Foreign Affairs)

Some observers believe that the American era is coming to an end, as the Western-oriented world order is replaced by one increasingly dominated by the East. The historian Niall Ferguson has written that the bloody twentieth century witnessed "the descent of the West" and "a reorientation of the world" toward the East. Realists go on to note that as China gets more powerful and the United States' position erodes, two things are likely to happen: China will try to use its growing influence to reshape the rules and institutions of the international system to better serve its interests, and other states in the system -- especially the declining hegemon -- will start to see China as a growing security threat. The result of these developments, they predict, will be tension, distrust, and conflict, the typical features of a power transition. In this view, the drama of China's rise will feature an increasingly powerful China and a declining United States locked in an epic battle over the rules and leadership of the international system. And as the world's largest country emerges not from within but outside the established post-World War II international order, it is a drama that will end with the grand ascendance of China and the onset of an Asian-centered world order. That course, however, is not inevitable. The rise of China does not have to trigger a wrenching hegemonic transition. The U.S.-Chinese power transition can be very different from those of the past because China faces an international order that is fundamentally different from those that past rising states confronted. China does not just face the United States; it faces a Western-centered system that is open, integrated, and rule-based, with wide and deep political foundations. The nuclear revolution, meanwhile, has made war among great powers unlikely -- eliminating the major tool that rising powers have used to overturn international systems defended by declining hegemonic states. Today's Western order, in short, is hard to overturn and easy to join. This unusually durable and expansive order is itself the product of farsighted U.S. leadership. After World War II, the United States did not simply establish itself as the leading world power. It led in the creation of universal institutions that not only invited global membership but also brought democracies and market societies closer together. It built an order that facilitated the participation and integration of both established great powers and newly independent states. (It is often forgotten that this postwar order was designed in large part to reintegrate the defeated Axis states and the beleaguered Allied states into a unified international system.) Today, China can gain full access to and thrive within this system. And if it does, China will rise, but the Western order -- if managed properly -- will live on.

**Their protectionism uniqueness is massively overstated—prefer our evidence**

**Rodrik 9**, professor of political economy at Harvard University’s John F Kennedy School of Government, is the first recipient of the Social Science Research Council’s Albert O Hirschman Prize, (Dani, “Dani Rodrik: The myth of rising protectionism,” October 13, http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/dani-rodrikmythrising-protectionism/373102/)

There was a dog that didn’t bark during the financial crisis: protectionism. Despite much hue and cry about it, governments have, in fact, imposed remarkably few trade barriers on imports. Indeed, the world economy remains as open as it was before the crisis struck. Protectionism normally thrives in times of economic peril. Confronted by economic decline and rising unemployment, governments are much more likely to pay attention to domestic pressure groups than to upholding their international obligations. As John Maynard Keynes recognised, trade restrictions can protect or generate employment during economic recessions. But what may be desirable under extreme conditions for a single country can be highly detrimental to the world economy. When everyone raises trade barriers, the volume of trade collapses. No one wins. That is why the disastrous free-for-all in trade policy during the 1930’s greatly aggravated the Great Depression. Many complain that something similar, if less grand in scope, is taking place today. An outfit called the Global Trade Alert (GTA) has been at the forefront, raising alarm bells about what it calls “a protectionist juggernaut”. The GTA’s latest report identifies no fewer than 192 separate protectionist actions since November 2008, with China as the most common target. This number has been widely quoted in the financial press. Taken at face value, it seems to suggest that governments have all but abandoned their commitments to the World Trade Organization and the multilateral trade regime. But look more closely at those numbers and you will find much less cause for alarm. Few of those 192 measures are, in fact, more than a nuisance. The most common among them are the indirect (and often unintended) consequences of the bailouts that governments mounted as a consequence of the crisis. The most frequently affected sector is the financial industry. Moreover, we do not even know whether these numbers are unusually high when compared to pre-crisis trends. The GTA report tells us how many measures have been imposed since November 2008, but says nothing about the analogous numbers prior to that date. In the absence of a benchmark for comparative assessment, we do not really know whether 192 “protectionist” measures is a big or small number. What about the recent tariffs imposed by the United States on Chinese tires? President Barack Obama’s decision to introduce steep duties (set at 35 per cent in the first year) in response to a US International Trade Commission (USITC) ruling (sought by US labour unions) has been widely criticised as stoking the protectionist fires. But it is easy to overstate the significance of this case, too. The tariff is fully consistent with a special arrangement negotiated at the time of China’s accession to the WTO, which allows the US to impose temporary protection when its markets are “disrupted” by Chinese exports. The tariffs that Obama imposed were considerably below what the USITC had recommended. And, in any case, the measure affects less than 0.3 per cent of China’s exports to the US. The reality is that the international trade regime has passed its greatest test since the Great Depression with flying colours. Trade economists who complain about minor instances of protectionism sound like a child whining about a damaged toy in the wake of an earthquake that killed thousands. Three things explain this remarkable resilience: ideas, politics and institutions. Economists have been extraordinarily successful in conveying their message to policymakers—even if ordinary people still regard imports with considerable suspicion. Nothing reflects this better than how “protection” and “protectionists” have become terms of derision. After all, governments are generally expected to provide protection to their citizens. But if you say that you favour protection “from imports”, you are painted into a corner with Reed Smoot and Willis C. Hawley, authors of the infamous 1930 US tariff bill.

## 2ac coercion

**Weigh consequences—moral absolutism reproduces evil.**

**Isaac 2** — Jeffrey C. Isaac, James H. Rudy Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life at Indiana University-Bloomington, 2002 (“Ends, Means, and Politics,” Dissent, Volume 49, Issue 2, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via EBSCOhost, p. 35-36)

As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. [end page 35] This is why, from the standpoint of politics—as opposed to religion—pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with “good” may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of “good” that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

## 2ac economic engagement

**Economic engagement is the offer of economic incentives or removing trade and investment barriers – distinct from political, military and civil society engagement**

**Haass and O’Sullivan, 2k** - \*Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution AND \*\*a Fellow with the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution (Richard and Meghan, “Terms of Engagement: Alternatives to Punitive Policies” Survival,, vol. 42, no. 2, Summer 2000, <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/articles/2000/6/summer%20haass/2000survival.pdf>

Architects of engagement strategies can choose from a wide variety of incentives. Economic engagement might offer tangible incentives such as export credits, investment insurance or promotion, access to technology, loans and economic aid.3 Other equally useful economic incentives involve the removal of penalties such as trade embargoes, investment bans or high tariffs, which have impeded economic relations between the United States and the target country. Facilitated entry into the economic global arena and the institutions that govern it rank among the most potent incentives in today’s global market. Similarly, political engagement can involve the lure of diplomatic recognition, access to regional or international institutions, the scheduling of summits between leaders – or the termination of these benefits. Military engagement could involve the extension of international military educational training in order both to strengthen respect for civilian authority and human rights among a country’s armed forces and, more feasibly, to establish relationships between Americans and young foreign military officers. While these areas of engagement are likely to involve working with state institutions, cultural or civil-society engagement entails building people-to-people contacts. Funding nongovernmental organisations, facilitating the flow of remittances and promoting the exchange of students, tourists and other non-governmental people between countries are just some of the possible incentives used in the form of engagement.

## 2ac multiplank cp

**Can’t solve the economy—US is currently falling behind in negotiating BITs—revitalizing the US model by moving away from arbitration is key—the CP does not say include mediation which means it cannot solve**

**Di Rosa 12**-- partner at Arnold & Porter LLP, where he heads the firm's international arbitration practice group (Paolo, “The New 2012 U.S. Model BIT: Staying the Course”, 6/1, <http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2012/06/01/the-new-2012-u-s-model-bit-staying-the-course/>) EL

The new model BIT made no changes to the substantive investment law protections. Critics had recommended certain reforms, such as limiting the scope of expropriation exclusively to direct appropriations of property by the host state, restricting the scope of claims for violation of the minimum standard of treatment, and limiting the fair and equitable treatment protection to the standard articulated in Glamis Gold. Moreover, they had asked the administration to bar application of other international agreements through the BIT’s most favored nation (MFN) clause, and to limit the application of national treatment provisions to cases in which regulatory measures were enacted primarily for discriminatory purposes. In the end, however, the Administration rejected all such proposals. Accordingly, the new model BIT’s provisions on national treatment, MFN, minimum standard, expropriation, and transfers of funds remain unchanged from the 2004 model BIT. The arbitration clauses were also kept largely untouched. Critics of investment treaties had requested that the U.S. government either replace investor-State arbitration with State-State dispute resolution, or delay or limit the recourse to investor-State arbitration (for example, by requiring the exhaustion of local remedies and narrowing the definitions of “investor” and “investment”). However, the administration opted to retain unaltered the investment arbitration clauses of the 2004 model BIT. The sole exception was the clause in Art. 28(10) requiring the Parties “to strive to reach an agreement” for appellate review in the event that an appellate mechanism were established; that obligation was watered down in the new model to a requirement that the Parties “consider” whether arbitral awards under the BIT should be subject to any new appellate mechanism. (Consistently with this change, the new model BIT also eliminates Annex D of the 2004 version, which had required the Parties to commence negotiations within three years on an appellate mechanism for investment arbitration; such period had been significantly shortened to three months in CAFTA, was then restored to three years in the U.S.-Rwanda BIT, but has now been completely removed in the new model.) The new U.S. approach on investor-State arbitration contrasts with that of Australia, which has opted to forgo altogether any investor-State dispute resolution mechanisms in its future investment and trade treaties, and to rely instead on its domestic courts. The U.S. position also diverges from that of the European Parliament, which recently adopted a resolution urging that future dispute settlement mechanisms include a requirement that foreign investors must exhaust domestic remedies before initiating investor-State claims. So what did change significantly in the new model BIT? First, the administration added new transparency requirements. The new model BIT requires Parties to consult periodically on how to improve transparency practices with regard to publication of laws, decisions respecting investment, and arbitration proceedings. Additionally, a completely new section was added to Article 11 establishing transparency requirements relating to proposed and adopted regulations. Specifically, the model BIT requires Parties to publish proposed regulations, explain their purpose and rationale, allow public comments on them, and address such comments when adopting the final regulations. The new model also adds a requirement that each Party allow persons of the other Party to participate (e.g., by allowing them to comment) in standards-setting exercises; certain exceptions apply, however, including with respect to sanitary and phytosanitary measures. Both NGOs and investors should be pleased with the new transparency provisions, which could have the effect of forestalling a certain percentage of investor-State arbitrations, since the new provisions give investors an opportunity to discuss the effects of regulatory amendments — and host states a chance to reevaluate proposed changes — before final promulgation. In essence, these modifications allows for exchanges of views before the conditions for a dispute actually arise. Second, the administration expanded the scope of labor and environmental obligations, by imposing on the Parties an affirmative obligation to “ensure” that the Parties do not waive or derogate from domestic labor and environmental laws; the 2004 model had contained a more aspirational provision, calling only for the Parties to “strive to ensure.” The new model also adds a requirement that the Parties ensure that they “effectively enforce” their labor and environment laws. At the same time, however, the model BIT adds a new clause explicitly recognizing the Parties’ right to exercise regulatory discretion (so long as it is reasonable) and to make resource allocation decisions (so long as it is done in good faith). Finally, the new model adds a definition of “environmental law” and expands upon the definition of “labor law.” Labor and environmental groups had asked the administration to make labor and environmental obligations enforceable through State-State dispute resolution, as in the recent U.S. free trade agreements (FTAs) with Panama, Colombia, and Peru. However, the administration demurred, opting for the detailed and extensive consultation procedure found in some older FTAs. Predictably, the amendments left all interested sectors at least partly dissatisfied: labor and environmental groups consider the modifications too mild, while business groups have expressed concern that these particular provisions may hinder negotiation of new BITs with certain countries. Third, the administration introduced certain key changes designed to address investments in countries with state-led economies. Such changes include a new clause in the performance requirements article barring host States from requiring the use of domestic technology; a provision (akin to that in the U.S.-Korea BIT) requiring a Party to allow investors of the other Party to participate in the development of technical and similar standards on a non-discriminatory basis; and a clarification that the obligations under the model BIT fully cover state-owned enterprises, as well as other entities or persons that act under delegated governmental authority. Fourth, the new model includes a number of revisions to the financial service provisions, largely modeled on the 2008 U.S.-Rwanda BIT. For example, the text clarifies that measures relating to payment and clearing systems are within the scope of measures relating to financial services that States may adopt for prudential reasons and that are exempted from the scope of the BIT. The new model also adds a provision entitling a respondent State to ask a tribunal to promptly decide on prudential measures and the applicability thereto of the financial services exception. Further, the model BIT introduces a clarification that the Parties may adopt financial sector measures necessary to secure compliance with laws and regulations otherwise consistent with the BIT (including those designed to prevent deceptive or fraudulent practices, or to address the effects of a default on financial service contracts), subject only to the requirement that they not be applied in a discriminatory fashion. Ultimately, the administration did not include sovereign debt annexes such as those included in CAFTA, and the Panama, Peru, and Colombia FTAs, leaving the matter to future individual treaty discussions. Finally, the administration included a small but potentially valuable change to the definition of “territory of a Party,” by expressly including within the scope of that term the territorial sea, as well as high seas areas in which the Party may exercise sovereign rights or jurisdiction under customary international law. This amendment should sweep within the scope of the BIT such investments as off-shore oil and gas projects, and fish farms. The foregoing are but the more salient revisions; the new model includes other revisions, which are less far-reaching or merely formal. Ultimately, the 2012 model BIT changed only moderately from its 2004 predecessor. As investor protections were not diluted, business groups are generally pleased and hope that the new model will jumpstart BIT negotiations. The U.S. is currently a party to 40 BITs — far fewer than Germany and China, for example, which each have approximately 100 — and it lacks a BIT with major trading partners like China, India, Russia, and Brazil. Some have argued that the enhanced transparency, labor, and environment provisions in the new model may make it more difficult to negotiate long-awaited BITs with nations such as China and India. Others counter by noting that a model BIT is simply a starting point for negotiation, and that the amendments in the new model may not actually find their way into the final texts of future BITs. Thus, it shall remain to be seen whether the new model will in fact hinder current or future U.S. BIT negotiations.

**Delahunt, 12** – chairman of the Venezuela-US Friendship Group and retired U.S. Representative Globe, 30 October 2013, http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2012/10/30/podium-venezuela/EJ6Jd2yRKfaJ76HYrXb4WJ/story.html)

The recent election in Venezuela offers an opportunity to improve the US-Venezuela bilateral relationship. On Oc. 7th, President Hugo Chavez was reelected to a new six-year term by a nine point margin. I — along with hundreds of other international witnesses — was duly impressed with the transparency of the electoral process and the enthusiasm of Venezuelans for democracy. Eighty-one percent percent of registered voters went to the polls! This turnout was remarkable when compared to the United States and other “mature” democracies. Whether or not one agrees with Chávez’s policies, there can be no doubt that he won these elections fairly. There are so many checks and balances in the electoral system in Venezuela that there is virtually no room for fraud. The voter registry, the voting machines, the electronic ballot and the data transmission system are all fully audited by representatives of all the different political parties and independent observers. Former President Jimmy Carter recently called the Venezuelan voting system “the best in the world.” He noted that the voting machines print out a paper receipt that voters can look at to verify that their selection was recorded correctly, and poll workers check those receipts against the electronic tally. I was particularly struck by the atmosphere of peacefulness and mutual respect in the voting centers, where monitors from both pro-government and opposition groups were present. In contrast with elections past, the two main candidates manifested a similar attitude. Once the election authorities announced the results, opposition candidate Henrique Capriles rapidly conceded defeat, and he quickly scolded “radical” opposition supporters who insisted on alleging that fraud had taken place, despite no evidence to support their claims. Chávez also behaved gracefully, calling Capriles the following day to express his willingness to work together to mitigate the polarization that divided Venezuelans. Most of Venezuela’s political leadership — following a tumultuous power struggle, during which a coup d’Etat and violent protests occurred — appear to have accepted to follow the democratic rulebook and be more tolerant of one another. This is an important step forward, and the United States should encourage Venezuelans to continue seeking common ground, rather than support one group over another, as has at times been the case in recent years. Most importantly, over 55 percent of Venezuelan voters cast their vote in favor of Chávez. The United States should respect this outcome and seek to improve relations in areas where we can agree. Commercial relations between our two countries have generally been excellent, despite political differences, and both countries would greatly benefit from their expansion. Venezuela will no doubt continue to play a central role in the region’s new multilateral cooperation and consultation mechanisms, such as the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and the Community of Central American and Caribbean States (CELAC). The United States, which has increasingly found itself isolated in regional forums, would do well to find ways to work with these new groups greaton important issues such as drug trafficking and energy cooperation. Improved relations with Venezuela would greatly facilitate this task. Our government will certainly have important differences with Venezuela, particularly in the area of international relations. But we can agree to disagree, as we do with many other partners throughout the world. I am convinced that the Venezuelan government is prepared to respond favorably to such an initiative.

**Geoengineering is unpopular**

**Bullis, 09** (Kevin, senior editor, Technology Review, November 6, 2009, “U.S. Congress Considers Geoengineering,” MIT Technology Review, http://www.technologyreview.com/view/416187/us-congress-considers-geoengineering/, Hensel)

These last two reasons seem to have been in the back of Gordon's head during his opening remarks. "Geoengineering carries with it a tremendous range of uncertainties, ethical and political concerns, and the potential for catastrophic environmental side-effects. But we are faced with the stark reality that the climate is changing, and the onset of impacts may outpace the world's political and economic ability to avoid them," he said. "This issue is too important for us to keep our heads in the sand. We must get ahead of geoengineering before it gets ahead of us." Not everyone is taking things seriously though. Just before the committee got underway, the ranking Republican on the committee, Ralph Hall (Texas), turned to Gordon and asked, "You can stand a little fun about that outrageous thing we're going to talk about today?" Then, during the hearing he compared geoengineering to "flying elephants."

**Geo-Engineering fails**

**Moriarty and Honnery ’10** – Both PhDs

Patrick Moriarty, Ph.D. Department of Design, Monash University, and Damon Honnery, Ph.D. Department of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering, Monash University. “Why Technical Fixes Won’t Mitigate Climate Change”. Journal of Cosmology, 2010, Vol 8, 1921-1927. http://journalofcosmology.com/ClimateChange107.html

As discussed here, geoengineering is action intended to manipulate climate on a global, or at least regional, scale. Corner and Pidgeon (2010) have pointed out that our emissions of CO2 (which have raised atmospheric CO2 levels from the pre-industrial 280 ppm to the present 387 ppm) could also be considered geoengineering. If so, we are merely arguing about different forms of the practice. The potential use of geoengineering for climate mitigation received a boost with a paper by Nobel laureate Paul Crutzen (2006). Like the present authors, he argued that conventional methods of mitigation were not working—the CO2 atmospheric concentration continues to climb at about 2 ppm each year. His inspiration was the significant drop in global temperatures recorded in the year following the Mount Pinatubo volcanic eruption in the Philippines in June 1991. The cooling resulted from the emission of some 10 Mt of sulphate aerosols into the lower stratosphere in the tropics. Continuous deliberate placement of fine sulphate aerosols in the lower stratosphere would reflect some of the incoming short-wave solar radiation, increasing the Earth’s albedo, and counteracting the positive forcing from increased levels of GHGs. The options available for geoengineering can be either local in extent (such as altering the albedo of deserts, crops or urban areas) or global (such as the use of giant space-based mirrors). Only aerosol placement in the tropical stratosphere, albedo enhancement of marine stratiform clouds and reflective mirrors in space would have the potential to counteract a doubling or more of atmospheric CO2 ppm (Lenton and Vaughan 2009). Of these global approaches, the cheapest is likely to be aerosol placement. Except for space-based mirrors, the approaches appear both far cheaper and far faster to implement than more conventional mitigation methods. Because of the lack of progress in slowing emissions and the low cost and rapid cooling resulting from global measures, geoengineering is gaining acceptance. The U.K. Royal Society (2009) has endorsed it as a technique to be used alongside other mitigation methods. But implementing measures to reduce the planetary albedo run enormous risks. Global precipitation would on average be reduced—it is not possible to bring both global temperatures and precipitation to their previous levels (Bala 2009). Acidification of the oceans would continue, potentially destabilising ocean ecosystems (Doney et al. 2009). Also, because elevated levels of CO2 will persist for centuries, so too must geoengineering—the continuous placement of aerosols, for example. Any abrupt cessation because of dangerous side effects discovered would rapidly raise the forcing to levels corresponding to the GHG concentrations at that time, resulting in very rapid warming, with possibly catastrophic effects on ecosystems (Matthews and Caldeira 2007). Thus although the costs of aerosol placement may well be modest, the overall cost of countering the unwanted consequences could be very high. Recently, perhaps because of these serious drawbacks, some researchers have modelled the effects of more modest aerosol placement schemes. Rather than global year-round aerosol coverage, they have looked at techniques that might prevent melting of the Greenhouse ice cap or Arctic summer sea ice, or summer warming of the north Atlantic during the hurricane season (Caldeira and Wood 2008, MacCracken 2009). The aerosols might be locally applied, for part of the year, to address a very specific problem resulting from climate change. But to be effective, their effects would necessarily be felt globally (Caldeira and Wood 2008), and if several of these projects were to be implemented simultaneously, the combined gobal effects might be extremely uncertain.

## ptx- rr

**Won’t pass – base opposition and no moderates**

**Gandelman, 9/18**/13 – (Joe, “Republicans all in: government shutdown by Repubicans virtually certain” <http://themoderatevoice.com/186749/republicans-all-in-government-shutdown-by-repubicans-virtually-certain/>)

It’s going to happen. You can bet on it. Republicans now seem all in – despite some pesky noises from they-must-be-RINO websites such as the Wall Street Journal and the National Review about the dangers — to set the stage for a government shut down. And don’t be surprised if it then gets worse and House Republicans engineer a default on the debt ceiling as well:

House Republicans are moving forward with a government funding bill that would defund ObamaCare.

The legislation is a nod to House conservatives, some of whom quickly backed the plan.

But Senate Democrats and the White House have promised to reject any legislation that would defund the healthcare law, meaning the legislation won’t move farther than the House.

Unless the House and Senate can agree on legislation and get it to the White House by Oct. 1, the government will shut down at that time.

Basically, the GOP House leadership is politically twerking its powerful Tea Party sympathetic members. But the consquences to many Americans that even a brief shutdown would bring could be huge.

And who says this will necessarily be a brief shutdown?

The House measure would keep the government funded through Dec. 15 at the current $986 billion spending rate, rather than the lower $967 billion level called for in the 2011 Budget Control Act.

GOP leaders also announced Wednesday that they will condition a debt ceiling increase on a one-year delay of ObamaCare, approval of the Keystone XL pipeline and an outline for tax reform.

In other words:

Republicans are going to use political extortion — hurting the United States’s economy — if they can’t get policies that they are unable to get by winning elections or putting together coalitions in Congress. It’s a tough choice for Barack Obama and the Democrats: if this is allowed to happen it will fundamentally change the form of American democracy.

Republican Study Committee Chairman Steve Scalise (R-La.) said he was on board with the plan despite the higher spending level.

“This reflects the principles we’ve been pushing for,” he said. “We want to address ObamaCare directly in the CR. We want to address ObamaCare in the debt ceiling and this keeps both of those moving.”

Yes — in a way unprecedented in American democracy. And:

Rep. Tom Graves (R-Ga.), who authored a one-year CR that would increase defense spending while defunding ObamaCare, said he would vote for the new Boehner plan.

“It’s a step in the right direction,” Graves said. “The American people should view this as a victory.”

I agree with Booman: there is a notable lack of adults in the Republican room, and a notably large number of conservative talk show host followers and Tea Party members. Booman:

It’s a two-pronged approach. On the continuing resolution (CR) to fund the government, the Republicans will limit the funding to December 15th. The funding level will be slightly above what the Budget Control Act of 2011 calls for. And it will defund ObamaCare.

On the debt ceiling, they will have a separate vote that will delay ObamaCare for a year, authorize the Keystone XL pipeline, and provide an outline for tax reform.

Their hope is that they can successfully pass the buck to Republican senators who will be expected to sustain a filibuster against any CR or debt ceiling hike that includes money for health care.

It really doesn’t matter whether the Senate Republicans go along with the plan or not, because the government will shut down either way and we will default on our debts either way.

The pressure on Republican senators will be intense, but they’d rather let the House take the blame for the catastrophe.

The fact that the Senate Minority Leader, Mitch McConnell, is facing a primary challenge from his right makes it unlikely that he will ride to the House’s rescue this time around. If we’re hoping for adult leadership in the Senate, it will have to come from a rump of moderate Republican senators that doesn’t seem to exist.

**Engagement with Venezuela popular in Congress – Chavez’s death changed the equation.**

**Spetalnick ‘13**

Matt Spetalnick – White House correspondent who has covered news on four continents for Reuters, from Latin American coups and drug wars – Reuter’s – March 6th, 2013 – “Despite new hopes, U.S. treads cautiously after death of Venezuela's Chavez” – http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/03/06/uk-venezuela-chavez-usa-idUKBRE92504920130306

Washington's challenge will be to figure out how far to go in seizing the opening to engage with Venezuelan leaders as well as its political opposition without giving the impression of U.S. meddling following the socialist president's death after a two-year battle with cancer. "We're not interested in having a confrontational relationship with Venezuela," a senior U.S. official told Reuters. "We're going to have to see how things evolve. It's a dynamic period." For Washington, a major test will be whether Venezuela follows its own constitution - which has been widely interpreted to require a special election to pick Chavez's successor - and if such a vote is conducted in a free and fair way in "accordance with hemispheric norms," the official said. Washington had accused Chavez and his allies of electoral abuses, such as intimidating foes and misusing state media during his 14-year rule. Chavez had created headaches for successive U.S. administrations with his strong anti-American rhetoric and his alliances with some of Washington's main foes, including Cuba and Iran. The question now is whether his leftist "revolution" and incendiary foreign policy can live on without his dominant personality at the helm. In a normally divided Washington, Chavez's death brought a rare moment of bipartisan agreement, with Republicans and Democrats alike seeing it as a chance to turn a page after a long period of strained U.S.-Venezuelan ties.

**Prefer qualified evidence – PC doesn’t influence Congress**

**Dickinson 9** professor of political science at Middlebury College (Matthew, “Sotomayor, Obama and Presidential Power,” May 26, 2009 Presidential Power <http://blogs.middlebury.edu/presidentialpower/2009/05/26/sotamayor-obama-and-presidential-power/>]

What is of more interest to me, however, is what her selection reveals about the basis of presidential power. Political scientists, like baseball writers evaluating hitters, have devised numerous means of measuring a president’s influence in Congress. I will devote a separate post to discussing these, but in brief, they often center on the creation of legislative “box scores” designed to measure how many times a president’s preferred piece of legislation, or nominee to the executive branch or the courts, is approved by Congress. That is, how many pieces of legislation that the president supports actually pass Congress? How often do members of Congress vote with the president’s preferences? How often is a president’s policy position supported by roll call outcomes? These measures, however, are a misleading gauge of presidential power – they are a better indicator of congressional power. This is because how members of Congress vote on a nominee or legislative item is rarely influenced by anything a president does. Although journalists (and political scientists) often focus on the legislative “endgame” to gauge presidential influence – will the President swing enough votes to get his preferred legislation enacted? – this mistakes an outcome with actual evidence of presidential influence. Once we control for other factors – a member of Congress’ ideological and partisan leanings, the political leanings of her constituency, whether she’s up for reelection or not – we can usually predict how she will vote without needing to know much of anything about what the president wants. (I am ignoring the importance of a president’s veto power for the moment.) Despite the much publicized and celebrated instances of presidential arm-twisting during the legislative endgame, then, most legislative outcomes don’t depend on presidential lobbying. But this is not to say that presidents lack influence. Instead, the primary means by which presidents influence what Congress does is through their ability to determine the alternatives from which Congress must choose. That is, presidential power is largely an exercise in agenda-setting – not arm-twisting. And we see this in the Sotomayer nomination. Barring a major scandal, she will almost certainly be confirmed to the Supreme Court whether Obama spends the confirmation hearings calling every Senator or instead spends the next few weeks ignoring the Senate debate in order to play Halo III on his Xbox. That is, how senators decide to vote on Sotomayor will have almost nothing to do with Obama’s lobbying from here on in (or lack thereof). His real influence has already occurred, in the decision to present Sotomayor as his nominee. If we want to measure Obama’s “power”, then, we need to know what his real preference was and why he chose Sotomayor. My guess – and it is only a guess – is that after conferring with leading Democrats and Republicans, he recognized the overriding practical political advantages accruing from choosing an Hispanic woman, with left-leaning credentials. We cannot know if this would have been his ideal choice based on judicial philosophy alone, but presidents are never free to act on their ideal preferences. Politics is the art of the possible. Whether Sotomayer is his first choice or not, however, her nomination is a reminder that the power of the presidency often resides in the president’s ability to dictate the alternatives from which Congress (or in this case the Senate) must choose. Although Republicans will undoubtedly attack Sotomayor for her judicial “activism” (citing in particular her decisions regarding promotion and affirmative action), her comments regarding the importance of gender and ethnicity in influencing her decisions, and her views regarding whether appellate courts “make” policy, they run the risk of alienating Hispanic voters – an increasingly influential voting bloc (to the extent that one can view Hispanics as a voting bloc!) I find it very hard to believe she will not be easily confirmed. In structuring the alternative before the Senate in this manner, then, Obama reveals an important aspect of presidential power that cannot be measured through legislative boxscores.

**PC isn’t key to the debt ceiling**

**Klein, 9/18**/13 - columnist at the Washington Post, as well as a contributor to MSNBC. His work focuses on domestic and economic policymaking,(Ezra, Washington Post, “The White House doesn’t think it can prevent a government shutdown” <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/09/18/the-white-house-doesnt-think-it-can-prevent-a-government-shutdown/>)

And there is a difference between 2011 and 2013. Two of them, in fact.

1) In 2011, the White House knew whom to deal with. Back then, House Speaker John Boehner actually did seem reasonably in sync with his party on these issues, and so the White House was able to negotiate with Republican leadership on a deal. Today, the relevant negotiations are happening in the Republican Party, with GOP leadership trying to fight conservatives who want to shut down the government, and no one knows who actually has the power to cut and close a deal.

2) In 2011, the White House was willing to deal. The White House believed, in its gut, that Republicans had been given a mandate in the 2010 elections to extract exactly the kind of concessions they were demanding. In addition, the White House believed President Obama would be a likelier bet for reelection if he could cut a "grand bargain" with the newly resurgent Republicans, taking their key issue away from them.

This year, it's the White House that won the last election, and so they see no popular legitimacy behind Republican demands. In addition, they are deeply, fervently committed to the proposition that they will never again negotiate around the debt ceiling, as that's a tactic history will judge them harshly for repeatedly enabling. So even if Boehner could cut a deal on the debt ceiling, the White House isn't open to negotiating.

All of which helps explain the White House's more alarmist communications strategy. In 2011, the White House was confident they could cut a deal with Republicans and, in some ways, eager to do so. That gave them a sense of control over the situation.

This year, they're not willing to cut a deal with the Republicans on the debt ceiling, and they're not sure the Republicans can cut a deal with themselves on funding the government, all of which means the White House doesn't have much control over this situation. That's why they're trying to worry business and Wall Street and other outside actors who could put pressure on the GOP.

**Winners win—Bush proves**

**Fortier 9** [John, Research Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, January 14th, Spend Your Political Capital Before It's Gone, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0109/17395.html]

Bush came into the presidency after a protracted election dispute but acted like a man with a mandate. His election victory, no matter how small, was a form of political capital to be spent, and he pushed his tax and education reform packages through Congress. After the Sept. 11 attacks, Republican victories in the 2002 midterm election and the initial phase of the Iraq war, Bush gained more political capital. And each time, he spent it, going to Congress for more tax cuts, the creation of a Department of Homeland Security and other domestic priorities. Bush developed the image of a winner. Despite narrow Republican majorities in Congress, he succeeded in holding his party together and pulling out one legislative victory after another. He famously did not veto a bill in his first term. Even when Bush veered from a typical conservative agenda on education reform and Medicare prescription drugs, Republicans voted with him, although some held their noses. Republicans in Congress did not want to break the string of Bush’s first-term legislative juggernaut. Bush was spending his political capital and, by winning, was getting repaid. Bush’s 2004 reelection was the apex of his presidency. He won a spirited, high- turnout contest by a clear margin, he brought more Republicans to Congress, and he was ready to spend his latest cache of political capital on two big domestic priorities: Social Security reform and tax reform. But 2005 saw Bush lose all of his political capital. His domestic priorities were bold, but he had overreached and did not have plans that Congress could get to work on immediately. The legislative vacuum in Congress stood in contrast to Bush’s first term, where Congress was almost always busy at work on Bush priorities. More importantly, conditions in Iraq deteriorated, and the public began to lose confidence in the president and his ability to win the war. Bush himself said that he had spent his political capital in Iraq and had lost it there. Republican scandals and the president’s lack of leadership immediately after Hurricane Katrina further damaged Bush. The winning streak was over, the president’s job approval numbers had dropped and his days setting the legislative agenda were over. Even though Bush had his biggest Republican majorities in the 109th Congress, Republican leaders staked out their own agenda, not wanting to tie themselves to a now unpopular president. Bush never regained political capital after 2005. Ronald Reagan had early heady days when he controlled the agenda; his popularity waned, but he was able to regain his footing. Bill Clinton famously bounced from highs to lows and back again. But for Bush, there was no second act. Reagan and Clinton could counterpunch and thrive as president without control of Congress. The Bush presidency had only two settings: on and off. In his first term, Bush controlled the legislative agenda like a prime minister; in the second, others set the agenda. President-elect Barack Obama won election more convincingly than Bush, and he will have larger congressional majorities than Republicans had. No doubt he will begin with some political capital of his own. But as the Bush presidency has taught us, that capital will run out someday, and a real test of leadership will be how Obama adjusts.

**Plan’s popular and Obama doesn’t need to push—Rwanda BIT proves**

**Broadbent and Pancake 12**—Meredith Broadbent is a senior adviser at CSIS, where she holds the William M. Scholl Chair in International Business and Robbins Pancake a senior associate for the William M. Scholl Chair in International Business (“Reinvigorating the U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaty Program”, June, <http://csis.org/files/publication/120629_Broadbent_ReinvigoratingBIT_Web.pdf>) EL

What are the key constituencies?¶ Two constituencies in Washington tend to oppose BITs—significant portions of the development¶ community and some Democratic members of Congress close to labor and environmental interest¶ groups. The concerns of both constituencies need to be addressed in order for a robust BIT¶ program to go forward.¶ Traditionally, the development community has taken the view that economic development is¶ best promoted by foreign aid that, if targeted correctly, should be sustainable and eventually spur¶ local private-sector growth. Included in that view may also be skepticism about whether private¶ multinational business investors will actually integrate into the local economy and help develop¶ the institutional infrastructure and good governance necessary for long-term growth and employment.¶ The truth may be somewhere in the middle, but additional outreach to the development¶ community, advocacy organizations, and the African Development Bank would be useful.¶ A message in support of BITs needs to be crafted to confirm that in the twenty-first century¶ global economy, private-sector trade and investment are economic development tools that create¶ jobs and commerce in developing countries, thereby improving living standards.36 In addition, it is¶ important to demonstrate that BITs and other regional and multilateral agreements are vehicles for¶ increasing transparency and rule of law, not part of a hidden agenda of multinational companies¶ to exploit the developing world. For instance, the huge increase (cited above) in FDI as a percentage¶ of total investment, compared to foreign aid, demonstrates that dramatic changes have taken¶ place over the last 50 years. Further, of the 2,600 BITs concluded in the last 50 years, more than¶ 1,200 are South-South BITs between developing countries, which tend to disprove the allegation¶ of a North-South plot by the United States and multinational companies. In addition, the World¶ Bank and in particular its outgoing president Robert Zoellick are strong advocates of trade and¶ investment as development tools preferable to aid.¶ Congress, for its part, plays a direct role in developing and implementing national policy on¶ investment because the Senate, led by the Foreign Relations Committee, has the constitutional¶ responsibility to ratify treaties, including BITs. In addition, since foreign trade agreements—which¶ include chapters on investment—are subject to approvals by both houses, all members are involved¶ to some extent.¶ Therefore, part of a BIT program should include framing a message to Congress in support of¶ BITs and addressing the issues of interest to members. For instance, the studies referenced above,¶ which show that establishing BITs is a job creator in the United States, would be very useful. Likewise,¶ characterizing a reenergized U.S. BIT program as a counterweight to Chinese commercial¶ outreach to the developing world would appeal to many members.37 Certain members of Congress,¶ including Democrats like Congressmen Greg Meeks (D-NY) and Joe Crowley (D-NY) and¶ Senators Mark Warner (D-VA) and possibly Robert Menendez (D-NJ), could serve as champions¶ for the FDI and BITs with their colleagues. Indeed, given the arcane nature of BITs, finding a few¶ willing advocates to champion the merits of BITs is probably the way to proceed.¶ Ultimately, despite all the concerns and criticisms, on September 28, 2011, the Senate did¶ ratify the pending U.S.-Rwanda BIT by unanimous voice vote. So, the partisanship in the current¶ Congress apparently did not prove insurmountable in passing a BIT, as some had previously¶ thought.

**NO PC now—recent fights on Summers and Syria proves that Obama is ineffective**

**The budget fight comes before the debt ceiling and costs capital**

**Koring, 9/16**/13 (Paul, The Globe and Mail (Canada), “Obama faces fall clash with Congress;

Despite averting military action in Syria, U.S. President fights plunging approval ratings and feuding Republicans on Capitol Hill” lexis)

With war against Syria averted, or perhaps postponed, U.S. President Barack Obama can turn again to September's anticipated battles against his still-implacable Republican opponents.

Looming is a Sept. 30 deadline for Congress to fund ongoing government operations - everything from food stamps to new bullets - and a showdown is shaping up between a weakened President and Republicans riven by their own divisions.

Then, some time in October, the U.S. Treasury will face another crisis as it reaches its borrowing limit. Without an increase, which some Republicans want to block, the U.S. government could face default. Meanwhile, hopes for progress on major policy initiatives such as immigration reform, long expected to be the big legislative issue this fall, are fading.

As hostile as relations are, some observers suggest the averted showdown over Syria - it's now widely accepted that Congress would have rejected Mr. Obama's call for an authorization of force had it gone to a vote - didn't make things any worse.

"We don't know what September would have looked like in the absence of the Syria issue, but my guess is that it would have looked an awful lot like it looks today," said Sarah Binder, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, which watches Congress closely.

"These divisions over spending and size of government have been with us all along, and the [Republican] opposition to Obama has been quite strong all along. ... Set aside the issue of Syria, and really nothing has changed."

**No default impact – it’s political hype**

**Boccia, 9/18**/13 – fellow in federal budgetary affairs at the Heritage Foundation (Romina, “Debt Limit: Options and the Way Forward” <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/09/debt-limit-options-and-the-way-forward>)

If Congress does not raise the debt limit by mid-October, the Treasury would not necessarily default on debt obligations. Even while cash-strapped, the Treasury can reasonably be expected to prioritize principal and interest payments on the national debt, protecting the full faith and credit of the United States above all other spending. It is almost impossible to conceive that the Treasury and the President would choose to default on debt obligations because doing so would have damaging economic consequences.

Nevertheless, the Treasury and the President have repeatedly invoked the threat of default to pressure Congress into raising the debt ceiling without substantial spending cuts and policy reforms. In July, Secretary Lew said on ABC’s This Week: “Congress can’t let us default. Congress has to do its work.”[6] On August 26, he wrote to Congress: “Congress should act as soon as possible to protect America’s good credit by extending normal borrowing authority well before any risk of default becomes imminent.”[7] President Obama also mentioned default at the G-20 summit: “That includes making sure we don’t risk a U.S. default over paying bills we’ve already racked up.”[8 ]